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NOT TOO SEPARATE OR UNEQUAL: 
MARRIAGE PENALTY RELIEF AFTER OBERGEFELL 
Mitchell L. Engler & Edward D. Stein 
Abstract: Joint tax returns have generated controversy for many years. Married couples 
with the same joint income pay the same tax under our current system regardless of the 
earnings distribution between the spouses. This approach primarily rests on the idea that 
married couples share resources and operate as a single economic unit. Critics typically 
challenge this assumption and lament how marriage might significantly change a couple’s 
taxes. Depending on their earnings breakdown, a couple’s taxes could be reduced (a marital 
bonus for uneven-earners) or increased (a marital penalty for even-earners). These 
possibilities exist because the joint brackets are typically larger–but not twice as large–as the 
unmarried brackets. 
Recent Supreme Court decisions about same-sex marriage revitalize this debate since 
many same-sex couples face the marriage penalty. In response, some recent commentators 
propose the elimination of joint returns. However, such elimination faces serious roadblocks, 
including political concerns and tension with marriage’s collaborative character. While 
higher joint bracket allowances likewise would provide penalty relief, this would increase 
both marital bonuses and the associated revenue loss. 
We propose instead a unique solution to the current standstill: an option for married 
couples to calculate their tax on their separate earnings. These separate amounts would be 
combined on a joint return. The new separate brackets would be more than half the joint 
allowance but less than the singles cap. This range permits maximum flexibility to balance 
revenue concerns with other important values. Further, our approach would provide 
significant penalty relief without any undesired impact on bonuses. It also would maintain 
our deeply ingrained joint return system. Finally, we demonstrate the superiority of our 
proposal over other suggested compromises. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Though happily married, Angela and David Boyter would divorce at 
year end only to remarry early the next year.
1
 What explains such 
strange behavior? Interestingly, the U.S. imperfect tax code motivated 
the Boyters’ legal antics. Under the joint return system, certain couples 
pay higher taxes if married (as of December 31) than if unmarried. This 
results from the way the joint return system aggregates each spouse’s 
earnings and then calculates the couple’s tax based on joint marital 
brackets. Importantly, these joint brackets typically are larger than—but 
not twice as large as—the unmarried brackets.2 Thus, a married couple’s 
taxes generally increase upon marriage (a marital penalty) when the 
spouses earn roughly the same amount as each other. In the other 
direction, marriage can reduce a couple’s taxes (a marital bonus) when 
one spouse earns a great deal more than the other. The Boyters hoped to 
obtain the non-tax benefits of marriage for most of the year while 
avoiding the substantial tax hit associated with the marriage penalty.
3
 
                                                     
1. Boyter v. Comm’r, 668 F.2d 1382 (4th Cir. 1981). 
2. As discussed in greater detail in section I.B.1, the penalty also stems from our use of 
progressive rates. Our progressive rate system applies higher rates as income crosses over certain 
thresholds. The marriage penalty aspect arises where the joint thresholds are not twice as large as 
the single thresholds. We provide an illustrative example below in this Introduction. See infra notes 
10–17 and accompanying text.  
3. The Boyters’ attempt to avoid the marriage penalty failed. The appellate court held that the two 
divorces followed by the two subsequent remarriages were “sham transaction[s]” since the 
“underlying purpose” was “for the taxpayers to remain effectively married while avoiding the 
marriage penalty.” Boyter, 668 F.2d at 1387. 
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While the marital penalty has existed for many years, recent family 
law developments place it back in the spotlight. In Obergefell v. 
Hodges,
4
 the United States Supreme Court held that states must allow 
same-sex couples to marry and give full recognition to such marriages.
5
 
While same-sex couples may now marry throughout the United States, 
the joint return system imposes a significant cost on many of them. As a 
result, some such couples may decide to cohabitate in lieu of marriage or 
to opt for a civil union, domestic partnership, or other marriage-like 
relationship.
6
 This is because many same-sex couples are relatively even 
earners.
7
 Partly in light of this, some commentators have renewed calls 
to excise joint returns.
8
 Such elimination faces serious practical 
                                                     
4. __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
5. Id.  
6. The federal government does not treat civil unions or domestic partnerships as marriages, in 
general, and the Internal Revenue Service does not recognize such relationships as marriages for 
purposes of filing status. See Answers to Frequently Asked Questions for Registered Domestic 
Partners and Individuals in Civil Unions, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/ 
uac/answers-to-frequently-asked-questions-for-registered-domestic-partners-and-individuals-in-
civil-unions [https://perma.cc/2B8R-T5TH] (question 1). However, couples in domestic 
partnerships or civil unions in community property states that treat such relationships as the legal 
equivalent to marriage must split their community income on their federal returns. See I.R.S. Chief 
Couns. Mem. 201021050 (May 5, 2010), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-wd/1021050.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/E4DA-LGHU]. See also Answers to Frequently Asked Questions for Registered 
Domestic Partners and Individuals in Civil Unions, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 
https://www.irs.gov/uac/answers-to-frequently-asked-questions-for-registered-domestic-partners-
and-individuals-in-civil-unions [https://perma.cc/2B8R-T5TH] (question 9). As this article was 
going to press, the IRS issued regulations that clarified certain aspects of the Internal Revenue Code 
(IRS) as it relates to marriage. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-18(a) (2016). Specifically, these regulations 
require the terms “husband” and “wife” to be interpreted in a gender-neutral way in the IRC. They 
also reaffirm that individuals who are parties to a civil union, a registered domestic partnership, or 
the like, are not married for purposes of the IRC. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-18(c). 
7. See infra text accompanying notes 85–88. 
8. See, e.g., Lily Kahng, The Not-So-Merry Wives of Windsor: The Taxation of Women in Same-
Sex Marriages, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 325, 337–43 (2015) [hereinafter Kahng, Not-So-Merry 
Wives]; Lily Kahng, Marriage Tax Hurts Lesbian Couples, USA TODAY, April 12, 2015,  
at 7A, http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2015/04/12/same-sex-marriage-dual-earning- 
couples-marriage-penalties-joint-filing-taxes-column/25474745 [https://perma.cc/NFA3-UAXB] 
[hereinafter Kahng, Marriage Tax Hurts]; Melissa Murray & Dennis Ventry, Eliminate the 
Marriage Penalty, N.Y. TIMES: ROOM FOR DEBATE (Jan. 23, 2015, 2:43 PM), 
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/04/14/improving-on-the-tax-codes-marriage-
penalty/eliminate-the-marriage-penalty [https://perma.cc/R2QS-QLP5]. Others have argued for the 
elimination of joint return long before Obergefell. See, e.g., Anne Alstott, Updating the Welfare 
State: Marriage, the Income Tax, and Social Security in the Age of Individualism, 66 TAX L. REV. 
695 (2013); Shari Motro, The New “I Do”: Towards a Marriage-Neutral Income Tax, 91 IOWA L. 
REV. 1509 (2006); Lawrence Zelenak, Marriage and the Income Tax, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 339 
(1994); Marjorie Kornhauser, Love, Money, and the IRS: Family, Income-Sharing, and the Joint 
Income Tax Return, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 63 (1993); Pamela Gann, Abandoning Marital Status as a 
Factor in Allocating Income Tax Burdens, 59 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1980). 
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problems, including political and transitional concerns.
9
 Others have 
suggested higher joint brackets as a way to provide penalty relief. As 
illustrated below, however, this would cause an unjustified increase in 
marital bonuses with significant additional tax revenue loss. 
This leaves a problematic status quo: significant marital penalties 
without an obvious fix. We propose a unique and viable solution to this 
current quandary: provide married couples the option to calculate their 
income tax based on their separate earnings. The individual tax amounts 
would then be aggregated on a jointly filed marital return. By 
maintaining our deeply ingrained joint-return system, our proposal 
enhances political feasibility and minimizes transitional concerns. And 
unlike higher joint bracket allowances, our proposal allows marriage 
penalty relief without a corollary increase to marital bonuses. This limits 
revenue loss while preserving marital bonuses at an appropriate level. 
As noted above, our proposal would allow married couples the option 
to calculate taxes based on each spouse’s separate earnings. Full penalty 
relief would require separate brackets equal to the single unmarried 
brackets. Given revenue concerns, the separate brackets need not rise to 
that amount, as any amount above half the joint level would provide 
some penalty relief. Thus, our approach provides attractive flexibility to 
balance penalty relief with revenue concerns. 
In this regard, our proposal differs from the existing, but rarely used, 
married filing separate status. Married people currently have an option 
to file separate returns. This is rarely advantageous since the brackets are 
just half the joint return amount. Our proposal differs from the current 
married filing separate option in two main ways. First, our “married 
calculated separate” approach provides penalty relief by providing 
bracket allowances above half the joint return amount. Second, under 
our approach, married couples would still file a joint return given the 
collaborative value of such joint action. 
The following example illustrates the above points. Assume a 
progressive rate structure for single taxpayers with a 20% rate on the 
first $150,000 of income and 30% thereafter. Further assume a joint 
married allowance of $200,000 for the lower 20% rate. If Tim and Dan 
each earn $150,000, they would face a $10,000 marital penalty. If they 
cohabitate without marriage, each would pay tax at the lower 20% rate 
on all his income: $30,000 tax each for a $60,000 total. Marriage would 
                                                     
9. As discussed in section II.C.1, it also raises some theoretic issues. Joint return elimination 
triggers transitional concerns because it gets rid of the current marital bonuses that certain couples 
receive. Consider, for instance, taxpayers who may have taken such bonuses into account in 
reaching the marital decision. See infra text accompanying note 92. 
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increase their tax to $70,000 since they would pay tax at the higher 30% 
rate on $100,000 of their combined income.
10
 They would pay the same 
punitive $70,000 under the current married filing separate option since 
that option reduces the 20% bracket to just $100,000. In this case, Tim 
and Dan would owe $35,000 each for a $70,000 total.
11
 Our married 
calculated separate (MCS) option would raise the separate income 
allowance above $100,000 to $140,000, for example. If so, Tim and Dan 
would together owe only $62,000 tax (calculated as $31,000 each),
12
 a 
much lower penalty. 
In addition, our MCS approach would not expand marital bonuses. 
This favorably contrasts with proposed increases to the joint bracket 
allowances. To see this, consider uneven-earners Mary and Ann where 
Mary earns all of the couple’s $300,000 income. If they cohabitate, 
Mary would pay $75,000 tax since only half the income qualifies for the 
lower 20% rate.
13
 But marriage would decrease their tax to $70,000, for 
a $5,000 bonus.
14
 Importantly, our approach would not expand this 
bonus since Mary and Ann should still use the regular joint bracket 
allowances.
15
 Contrast now alternative penalty relief in the form of a 
higher $280,000 joint allowance. This would provide the same penalty 
relief to Tim and Dan as provided by our approach.
16
 However, this 




                                                     
10. As a married couple, they would report $300,000 aggregate income, only $200,000 of which 
would qualify for the lower 20% rate. ($200,000 x 20%) + ($100,000 x 30%) = $70,000.  
11. The separate $100,000 bracket equals half the joint $200,000 allowance. As such, each would 
owe ($100,000 x 20%) plus ($50,000 x 30%), equal to $35,000. 
12. Each would have $140,000 taxed at 20% ($28,000) plus $10,000 taxed at 30% ($3,000).  
13. As an unmarried individual, only $150,000 of her income qualifies for the lower 20% rate; the 
remaining $150,000 is taxed at the 30% rate. ($150,000 x 20%) + ($150,000 x 30%) = $75,000.  
14. This is the same calculation as for married Tim and Dan with the $200,000 joint allowance. 
See supra note 10. Recall how married couples with the same aggregate earnings pay the same tax 
with joint returns regardless of the earnings breakdown. 
15. Our new option to calculate separately would increase their tax. By calculating jointly, this 
couple’s tax bill would stay at the $70,000 amount calculated above for them (with $200,000 taxed 
at the lower rate). By taking our option, though, their tax would increase, since only $140,000 total 
would qualify for the lower rate since all the income is earned by just one spouse.  
16. Each individual would have $140,000 taxed at the lower 20% rate under our approach, equal 
to $280,000 in the aggregate. See supra note 11. 
17. By calculating jointly, Mary and Ann’s tax bill would drop to the same $62,000 as Tim and 
Dan since (i) $280,000 of the income would qualify for the lower 20% rate, with (ii) only $20,000 
subject to the higher 30% rate. This would increase the bonus from $5,000 ($75,000 – $70,000) to 
$13,000 ($75,000 – $62,000). This results because marriage allowed an additional $130,000 of 
income ($280,000 – $150,000) to qualify for a 10% lower tax rate (20% rather than 30%). 
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Our discussion proceeds as follows. Part I reviews the origins of the 
joint return, demonstrating the linkage of joint returns to marriage 
penalties and bonuses. This Part also explains how current law resolves 
the tension between marital penalties and bonuses. 
In Part II, we first trace the same-sex marriage developments over 
time, culminating with the recent Windsor and Obergefell decisions.
18
 
We next discuss how these recent opinions revitalize the long-standing 
marriage penalty issue. While some reformers propose eliminating joint 
returns in response to recent events,
19
 we demonstrate why this lacks 
viability as a reform option. By excising all current bonuses, this reform 
approach undercuts the general policy of encouraging marriage and the 
propriety of a tax reduction for certain married couples. On the practical 
side, eliminating joint-returns presents transitional and political 
roadblocks.
20
 We show that recent developments support instead a more 
targeted reform approach limited to just marriage penalties. 
In Part III, we consider three prior proposals that share our vision of 
marital penalty relief without the elimination of all marital bonuses. One 
approach would double the singles tax brackets for even-earner 
spouses.
21
 Another approach would permit married couples to file taxes 
as if they were single.
22
 Finally, former presidential candidate Jeb 
Bush’s intriguing approach combines (i) separate return filing for the 
low-earner’s wages with (ii) joint return filing for the remaining marital 
income (including all investment income).
23
 We demonstrate the serious 
shortcomings of these three proposals. 
                                                     
18. Obergefell v. Hodges, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); United States v. Windsor, 
__ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
19. See Kahng, Not-So-Merry Wives, supra note 8; Kahng, Marriage Tax Hurts, supra note 8; 
Murray & Ventry, supra note 8. 
20. As a recent indication of this, note that most of the 2016 presidential candidates oppose the 
marriage penalty, but no candidate has proposed elimination of joint returns. See infra note 25. 
21. Margaret Ryznar, An Easy Solution to the Marriage Penalty, PEPP. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2017), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2643832 [https://perma.cc/24CS-MF5H].  
22. H.R. 2456, 105th Cong. § 2 (1997); S. 1314, 105th Cong. § 2 (1997). For discussion of this 
proposal, see Lawrence Zelenak, Doing Something About Marriage Penalties: A Guide for the 
Perplexed, 54 TAX L. REV. 1, 11–21 (2000).  
23. See JOHN COGAN, ET AL., FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM: AN ESSENTIAL PILLAR OF 
ECONOMIC GROWTH: AN ASSESSMENT OF GOVERNOR JEB BUSH’S “REFORM AND GROWTH ACT OF 
2017” (Sept. 9, 2015), http://thecge.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Fundamental-Tax-Reform-An-
Essential-Pillar-of-Economic-Growth1.pdf [https://perma.cc/74P5-JPBF]; LEN BURMAN, ET AL, 
URB. INST. & BROOKINGS INST. TAX POL’Y CENTER, AN ANALYSIS OF GOVERNOR BUSH’S TAX 
PLAN (Dec. 8, 2015) http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/analysis-governor-bushs-tax-plan 
[https://perma.cc/MF5M-A6X5]. 
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In Part IV, we demonstrate the superiority of our MCS approach over 
these prior attempts to combine penalty relief with bonus retention. By 
fully disentangling marriage penalties from marriage bonuses, our 
proposal allows targeted penalty relief without any undesired impact on 
bonuses. Further, our approach provides more flexibility to balance 
revenue concerns and other competing values. Finally, our approach 
maintains the collaborative character of joint filing by simply 
aggregating each spouse’s separately determined tax on a joint return. 
Our approach uses a schedule (that is, a separate form like a “Schedule 
C” form used for sole proprietor business income) to determine each 
spouse’s tax and then aggregates these separate amounts into a combined 
total on a jointly filed marital return. We then defend our proposal 
against potential critiques, and finish with some guidelines for the rate 
bracket percentages at different income levels. 
Part V summarizes the key arguments in favor of our divergent 
treatment of marital penalties and bonuses. We then highlight how our 
approach would liberate the marital decision from the distorting tax 
penalty incentive to cohabitate in lieu of marriage or engage in Boyter-
like legal antics. 
I. THE JOINT RETURN AND THE MARRIAGE PENALTY 
Politicians and analysts have criticized the marriage penalty since its 
arrival in 1969.
24
 In fact, many of the 2016 presidential candidates 
proposed some form of penalty relief.
25
 This dissatisfaction is not 
                                                     
24. See infra text accompanying notes 27–38. 
25. In late fall 2015, we surveyed the statements of most of the then nationally recognized 
candidates for President of the United States on the topic. See, e.g., Tax Reform That Will Make 
America Great Again, DONALD J. TRUMP, https://www.donaldjtrump.com/positions/tax-reform 
[https://perma.cc/62US-HP2R] (Donald Trump); BURMAN, supra note 23 (Jeb Bush); The Jindal 
Tax Reform: Everybody Has to Have Some Skin in the Game, BOBBY JINDAL, 
https://www.bobbyjindal.com/policy/tax-reform/ [https://perma.cc/VA6R-W38X] (Bobby Jindal); 
URB. INST. & BROOKINGS INST. TAX POL’Y CENTER, THE SANTORUM TAX PLAN (January 18, 
2012), http://taxpolicycenter.org/taxtopics/Santorum-plan.cfm [https://perma.cc/P6GK-HC25] (Rick 
Santorum); Ben Carson on Tax Reform, ON THE ISSUES, http://www.ontheissues. 
org/2016/Ben_Carson_Tax_Reform.htm [https://perma.cc/G2XJ-GRSC] (Ben Carson); The Simple 
Flat Tax Plan, CRUZ/FIORINA 2016, https://www.tedcruz.org/tax_plan/ [https://perma.cc/8STL-
TTBF] (Ted Cruz); Carly Fiorina on the Issues, ON THE ISSUES, http://www.ontheissues. 
org/Carly_Fiorina.htm [https://perma.cc/NZG6-2RD8] (Carly Fiorina); Lindsey Graham on Tax 
Reform, ON THE ISSUES, http://www.ontheissues.org/Economic/Lindsey_Graham_Tax_Reform.htm 
[https://perma.cc/GYL7-B4J6] (Lindsey Graham); Mike Huckabee on Tax Reform, ON THE ISSUES, 
http://www.ontheissues.org/celeb/Mike_Huckabee_Tax_Reform.htm [http://perma.cc/UT7W-
RCEA] (Mike Huckabee); John Kasich on the Issues, ON THE ISSUES, 
http://www.ontheissues.org/John_Kasich.htm [https://perma.cc/8TBX-T5J8] (John Kasich); Hillary 
Clinton on Tax Reform, ON THE ISSUES, http://www.ontheissues.org/celeb/Hillary 
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surprising since governments typically encourage marriage through 
various benefits.
26
 This Part explores how we arrived at this aberrational 
juncture. Section A discusses the historical origins of the penalty. 
Section B defines three core tax values: progressivity, couples neutrality, 
and marital neutrality. Section C next demonstrates the incompatibility 
of these values. Section D explains how current law resolves this tension 
among the key values. 
A. Historical Origins 
The original 1913 income tax did not penalize marriage.
27
 At that 
time, spouses were simply treated as two separate taxpayers.
28
 In 1918, 
Congress authorized husbands and wives to make “a single joint 
return.”29 Initially, there was little incentive to file jointly since the joint 
brackets were the same as the singles brackets.
30
 In addition, there was 
an incentive for many husbands to shift income to their wives under the 
                                                     
_Clinton_Tax_Reform.htm [http://perma.cc/9AAN-YZUT] (Hillary Clinton); Bernie Sanders on 
Tax Reform, ON THE ISSUES, http://www.ontheissues.org/2016/Bernie_Sanders_Tax_Reform.htm 
[https://perma.cc/Y623-HDKH] (Bernie Sanders). The other candidates’ policies were unclear as of 
that time. For further discussion of the proposal of candidate Trump, see infra text accompanying 
note 95. For further discussion of the proposal of former candidate Bush, see infra text 
accompanying notes 118–120 & 152–157. 
26. The benefits of marriage include, for example, spousal immigration assistance, spousal 
testimonial privileges, social security benefits, estate tax avoidance, and veterans’ benefits. There 
are over a thousand federal laws for which marital status is a factor (although not all the laws in 
which marital status is a factor actually benefit married couples). See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING 
OFFICE, GAO-04-353R, DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT: UPDATE TO PRIOR REPORT (2004), 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04353r.pdf [https://perma.cc/N9HA-26Y4] (updating GAO/OGC-
97-16, DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT (1997), http://www.gao.gov/archive/1997/og97016.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/F4LB-29SV]). States have at least as many laws associated with being married. In 
New York, for example, statutes and regulations confer over 1300 legal rights and duties on married 
individuals. See EMPIRE STATE PRIDE AGENDA & NEW YORK CITY BAR ASS’N, 1324 REASONS FOR 
MARRIAGE EQUALITY IN NEW YORK STATE (2007), http://www.nycbar.org/pdf/report/marriage 
_v7d21.pdf [https://perma.cc/SSD9-RLPG].  
27. This discussion is to some extent drawn from Carlton Smith & Edward Stein, Dealing with 
DOMA: Federal Non-Recognition Complicates State Income Taxation of Same-Sex Relationships, 
24 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 29, 37–40 (2012); see also Zelenak, supra note 8, at 344–48. 
28. See Boris Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1389, 1399–
414 (1975). 
29. Federal Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 223, 40 Stat. 1057, 1074 (providing, in part, “If a 
husband and wife living together have an aggregate net income of $2,000 or over, each shall make 
such a return unless the income of each is included in a single joint return.”). 
30. See Smith & Stein, supra note 27, at 37–38. As noted therein, there was one tax rate schedule 
insofar as regular taxes and surtaxes are combined. 
07 - Engler & Stein.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/4/2016  5:10 PM 
2016] MARRIAGE PENALTY RELIEF 1081 
 
progressive rate structure. Since the husband typically had most of the 
income, such shifted income would get taxed at a lower rate.
31
 
In 1930, the Supreme Court held that a husband’s earned income 
could not be shifted to his wife in a common law separate property 
jurisdiction.
32
 Shortly thereafter, however, the Court held that a wife 
properly reported half her husband’s income in a community property 
jurisdiction.
33
 These two cases created a significant interstate tax 
asymmetry. Couples with the same income had very different tax bills 
depending on whether they lived in a community or separate property 
jurisdiction. Some separate property jurisdictions responded by 




Congress expanded the income splitting benefits to all married 
taxpayers in 1948.
35
 Under the 1948 changes, the married joint brackets 
equaled twice the single brackets.
36
 In 1969, Congress expanded the 
singles tax brackets to 60% of the married joint brackets.
37
 In light of the 
1969 changes, the marriage penalty emerged.
38
 
B. Structural Origins 
The marriage penalty originates from tension among three important 
tax values. To better understand the penalty’s structural origins, this 
                                                     
31. For further details on this history, see, e.g., Patricia Cain, Taxing Families Fairly, 48 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 806–19 (2008). 
32. Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 11 (1930). In a common law separate property jurisdiction, a married 
person’s earnings are treated as separate, not marital, property at least so long as the couple remains 
married. In a community property system, however, each spouse generally has a vested half-interest 
in their income regardless of source. 
33. Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930). 
34. The states that temporarily adopted the community property approach were Hawaii, 
Michigan, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Oregon and Pennsylvania. (Massachusetts and New York seriously 
considered doing so as well.) See, e.g., Bittker, supra note 28, at 1411–12. The Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court declared its state’s community property law unconstitutional. Wilcox v. Penn. 
Mutual Life Ins. Co., 55 A.2d 521 (Penn. 1947). After the Revenue Act of 1948 was passed, the 
legislatures in the remaining five states repealed their community property laws. See, e.g., Note, 
Epilogue to the Community Property Scramble: Problems of Repeal, 50 COLUM. L. REV. 332, 332–
33 (1950). 
35. This eliminated the unequal treatment to married taxpayers in separate property jurisdictions. 
Federal Revenue Act of 1948, ch. 168, § 303, 62 Stat. 110, 115 (“A husband and wife may make a 
single return jointly of income taxes under subtitle A, even though one of the spouses has neither 
gross income nor deductions.”). This is currently provided for at I.R.C. § 6013(a) (2012). 
36. Federal Revenue Act of 1948, ch. 168, § 301, 62 Stat. 110, 114 (1948). 
37. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91–172, § 803, 83 Stat. 487, 678–85 (1969). 
38. See, e.g., Bittker, supra note 28, at 1429–31; Zelenak, supra note 22, at 5–6. 
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section sets forth the three mutually exclusive values: progressivity, 




A flat income tax rate stays constant regardless of the reported 
income amount. In contrast, progressive tax rates increase at higher 
income levels.
40
 Progressivity generally rests on the diminishing 
marginal utility of money: the value of money decreases as the owner’s 
wealth increases.
41
 Wealthier taxpayers should thus pay a higher 
percentage of their earnings, and not just a higher amount based on the 
same flat percentage. For instance, assume that Richie has twice as much 
income as Lowell: $200,000 versus $100,000. Richie would pay twice as 
much tax as Lowell under a flat 20% rate: $40,000 versus $20,000.
42
 But 
Richie would pay more than twice as much as Lowell under a 
progressive rate structure of 20% up to $100,000 income, and 30% 
thereafter: $50,000 versus $20,000.
43
 
2. Couples Neutrality 
Couples neutrality provides that married couples with identical joint 
incomes should pay the same tax regardless of the earnings breakdown 
between the spouses. Proponents of couples neutrality argue that married 
couples tend to share their resources equally regardless of source.
44
 
Furthermore, married couples generally have a mutual duty of support 
                                                     
39. See, e.g., MICHAEL GRAETZ & DEBORAH SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: PRINCIPLES 
AND POLICY 451–52 (7th ed. 2013); Alstott, supra note 8, at 705; Zelenak, supra note 22, at 6–7; 
Bittker, supra note 28, at 1396.  
40. For historical data on progressivity from 1862 to 2013, see TAX FOUNDATION, Federal 
Individual Income Tax Rates Adjusted for Inflation, http://www.scribd.com/doc/190500966/Federal-
Individual-Individual-Income-Tax-Rate-Adjusted-for-Inflation [https://perma.cc/YLH3-STMF]. 
41. See, e.g., WALTER J. BLUM & HARRY KALVEN, JR., THE UNEASY CASE FOR PROGRESSIVE 
TAXATION (1953). Some progressive arguments rest instead on other principles such as equality of 
opportunity. See, e.g., Mitchell Engler, Progressive Consumption Taxes, 57 HASTINGS L. J. 55 
(2005). 
42. Richie’s tax equals $200,000 x 20%, while Lowell’s equals $100,000 x 20%. 
43. Richie’s tax increases to $50,000: ($100,000 x 20%) + ($100,000 x 30%). 
44. Jessica Hardie & Amy Lucas, Economic Factors and Relationship Quality Among Young 
Couples: Comparing Cohabitation and Marriage, 72 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 1141, 1143 (2010) 
(“Furthermore, married couples typically manage their resources jointly, allowing them to adjust to 
changing economic circumstances, whereas cohabiting partners are less likely to pool their 
income.”). 
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under common law and some state family expense statutes.
45
 Further 
note how joint returns achieve couples neutrality by aggregating each 
spouse’s income. This links to another couples neutrality virtue: the 
government must police attempted income shifts by uneven-earners 
absent such neutrality. To see this, recall the incentives for uneven-
earners to shift income to the low-earner prior to the advent of joint 




Finally, as a practical matter, note how couples neutrality benefits 
unequal-earner couples. Without couples neutrality, an uneven-earner 
couple can pay more tax than an even-earner couple with the same 
aggregate income.
47
 Couples neutrality, however, equalizes the tax 
burden of the two couples. 
3. Marital Neutrality 
Marital neutrality provides that marital status should not impact one’s 
tax bill. This links to the broader tax efficiency principle that ideal taxes 
minimize the distortion of taxpayer preferences.
48
 Section C below 
illustrates two types of marital neutrality violations depending on 
whether marriage increases (penalties) or decreases (bonuses) the 
couple’s tax bill.49 
Although an important tax value, marital neutrality is at odds with 
family law inducements to marriage.
50
 In addition, “economies of scale” 
arguably support a tax increase when two equal-earners marry because 
they can live more cheaply together than apart.
51
 Likewise, the 
                                                     
45. See, e.g., HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 
252–58 (2d. ed. 1988). 
46. See supra section I.A.  
47. Without couples neutrality, each couple’s taxes would be based on the individual earnings of 
each spouse. As such, the high (uneven) earner could be taxed at a higher (progressive) rate.  
48. This assumes that the government should generally respect taxpayer preferences. And so, 
while the government has power to extract tax payments from its citizens, it generally should do so 
in a manner that least impacts the pre-tax choices of citizens. But see infra note 96 and 
accompanying text for a special exception where the government purposefully intends to encourage 
desirable behaviors. 
49. See infra text accompanying notes 102–103, where we suggest a modification to marital 
neutrality that separates penalties from bonuses. This is more fully developed in section IV.A. 
50. See infra text accompanying notes 95–98. 
51. See e.g., Robert S. McIntyre & Michael J. McIntyre, Fixing the “Marriage Penalty” 
Problem, 33 VAL. U. L. REV. 908, 912–13 (1999) (setting forth, and then rejecting, such 
justification). The fact that couples can achieve some economies of scale via cohabitation somewhat 
undercuts this justification. Nevertheless, marriage might induce even greater economies of scale, 
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additional financial responsibility arguably supports a tax decrease when 
a high-earner marries a low-earner.
52
 
Finally, as a practical matter, note how marital neutrality benefits 
equal-earner couples. With marital neutrality, an even-earner couple can 
pay less tax than an uneven-earner couple with the same aggregate 
income.
53
 As noted above, the substitution of couples neutrality for 
marital neutrality would equalize the tax burden of the two couples, 
albeit with a loss in tax efficiency.
54
 
C. The Trilemma Involving Three Core Tax Values 
This section demonstrates the incompatibility of the three core values, 
the so-called trilemma. A progressive tax rate system cannot provide 
pure couples neutrality and pure marital neutrality.
55
 This section further 
highlights the additional tension between marital bonuses and penalties. 
To illustrate these tradeoffs, consider two married couples. Eva and 
Evan each earn $100,000 of income. Dina and Virgil also have $200,000 
aggregate income, all earned by Dina. Further assume two rates for 
singles: a 20% rate on income up to $100,000, with a 30% rate 
thereafter.
56
 To achieve pure couples neutrality, the system must require 
joint returns. This ensures that married couples with the same aggregate 
income pay the same tax. For example, even-earners Eva/Evan would 
pay less tax than divergent-earners Dina/Virgil without joint returns. 
High-earner Dina would pay tax at the 30% rate on half of her $200,000 
income, but Eva/Evan would pay tax at the lower 20% rate on all their 
income. As demonstrated below, however, joint returns inevitably 
violate marital neutrality in the form of marital penalties, marital 
bonuses, or some combination thereof. 
                                                     
for example, through improved long-term planning. See also Hardie & Lucas, supra note 44 (noting 
that cohabiting couples are less likely to pool resources than married couples).  
52. For further development of this proposition, see infra note 91 and accompanying text. 
53. With marital neutrality, each couple’s taxes would be based on the individual earnings of each 
spouse. And again, the high (uneven) earner could be taxed at a higher (progressive) rate.  
54. Couples neutrality undermines tax efficiency, as the act of marriage would change some 
couples’ tax bills.  
55. As we discuss in section IV.D, a tax system can accommodate partial couples neutrality and 
partial marital neutrality as part of a more refined balancing act. 
56. In actuality, our system has more than two brackets but all the key points can be more readily 
exposed through such a simplified example. Other elements of our system, such as the earned 
income tax credit (EITC) and the head of household filing status, complicate the issue further. See, 
e.g., Zelenak, supra note 22, at 7–8. For ease of exposition, we abstract away from these 
complexities. See also our discussion of the EITC in section IV.E.  
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To see this, let’s now determine the joint bracket amount. Consider 
first the most generous allowance of $200,000—twice the singles 
amount.
57
 This would eliminate all penalties, as Eva/Evan would be 
taxed at just the lower 20% rate on their aggregate $200,000 income. 
This $200,000 bracket maximizes the bonuses, however, as evidenced 
by Dina and Virgil. By marrying instead of cohabitating, Dina and Virgil 
would receive a sizable tax benefit as the lower 20% rate would apply to 
an additional $100,000 of their joint income.
58
 
At the other extreme, a $100,000 joint bracket allowance would 
eliminate Dina and Virgil’s bonus. But this equalization of the single and 
joint brackets would subject Eva and Evan to the maximum marital 
penalty. By marrying instead of cohabitating, Eva and Evan would be hit 
with a sizable tax detriment: the higher 30% rate would apply to an 
additional $100,000 of income.
59
 
A third middle-ground alternative would increase the joint brackets 
above the singles amount, but not all the way to $200,000. For example, 
a $150,000 bracket would split the difference between the potential 
penalties and bonuses.
60
 Eva and Evan would now face the higher 30% 
rate on an extra $50,000 of income,
61
 while Dina and Virgil would 
benefit from the lower 20% rate on an extra $50,000 of income.
62
 A 
comparison of this alternative to the prior one illustrates the inherent 
tension between penalties and bonuses. Raising the marital bracket from 
$100,000 to $150,000 would cut Eva and Evan’s penalty in half. But this 
                                                     
57. This might be justified on grounds that a married couple aggregates the income of two 
individuals.  
58. If they cohabitate, $100,000 would be taxed at 20%, with $100,000 taxed at 30% (since one 
single person would report $200,000). In contrast, if they marry, all $200,000 would now qualify for 
the lower 20% rate.  
59. If they cohabitate, each individual’s earnings of $100,000 would be taxed at 20%. But if they 
marry, $100,000 would be taxed at 30% (since their aggregate $200,000 would exceed the 20% 
bracket threshold of $100,000 by $100,000). 
60. As discussed in greater detail below, Lawrence Zelenak, For Better and Worse: The Differing 
Income Tax Treatments of Marriage at Different Income Levels, 93 N.C. L. REV. 784, 816 (2015), 
suggested just such an approach as a starting assumption (subject to override in certain situations). 
See infra text accompanying notes 172–174. 
61. If they cohabitate, each individual’s earnings of $100,000 would be taxed at 20%. But if they 
marry, $50,000 would be taxed at 30% (since their aggregate $200,000 would exceed the 20% 
bracket threshold of $150,000 by $50,000). 
62. If they cohabitate, $100,000 would be taxed at 20% with $100,000 taxed at 30% (since one 
single person would report $200,000). But if they marry, $150,000 would now qualify for the lower 
20% rate.  
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D. How Current Law Resolves the Trilemma 
The current joint brackets use all three of the above possibilities. 
First, the lowest 10% and 15% joint brackets are twice the single 
brackets.
64
 At the other extreme, the 33% bracket cap remains exactly 
the same for single and joint returns at $411,500.
65
 The law moderates at 
other levels with joint brackets larger than, but not twice the size of, the 
singles amount. These moderate increases range from a low of 13% for 
the 35% bracket to a high of 67% for the 25% bracket.
66
 Current law 
thus trends towards bonuses at the lower brackets,
67
 and penalties at the 
higher brackets. 
                                                     
63. A flat tax rate plus a refundable credit (a “demogrant”) could reconcile these values. 
Zelenack, supra note 22, at 75–77. The demogrant’s limited impact at higher income levels would 
create some progressivity. The effective tax rate would move closer to the stated tax rate at higher 
income levels. Assume a flat 20% rate with a $10,000 demogrant and two individuals with the 
following income: $100,000 (Lois), and $200,000 (Hi). Lois would owe $10,000 tax for a 10% 
effective rate. [($100,000 x .2) – $10,000 demogrant = $10,000 tax.] Hi would owe $30,000 tax for 
a 15% effective rate. [($200,000 x .2) – $10,000 demogrant = $30,000 tax.] Further assume that a 
married couple would receive a doubled $20,000 joint demogrant and consider again our 
Dina/Virgil and Eva/Evan couples. Couples neutrality exists since each couple would owe $20,000 
tax on their $200,000 aggregate income. [($200,000 x .2) – $20,000 demogrant = $20,000 tax.] 
Marital neutrality also exists since each couple would owe the same $20,000 total if they cohabited. 
If so, Eva and Evan would each owe the same $10,000 as Lois above. With cohabitation, Dina 
would owe the same $30,000 as Hi above on her $200,000 earnings while Virgil, the zero-earner, 
would receive a $10,000 demogrant payment from the government. This reconciliation of the 
trilemma values would require a government commitment to pay out demogrants to low-earners, a 
seeming non-starter on political grounds. In addition, this approach can impose limited progressivity 
since it rests solely on the demogrant. Contrast how our current system provides a variety of 
changing rates over the income spectrum. See I.R.C. § 1(a) (2012). Practically speaking, the 
trilemma remains intact despite this intellectually intriguing possibility.  
64. As discussed above, this doubling of the singles bracket eliminates rate bracket penalties but 
maximizes bonuses. For tax year 2015, the $9,225 cap on 10% Tax Rate for singles increases to 
$18,450 for Married Filing Jointly. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., INTERNAL REVENUE BULLETIN 
2014-47, § 3 (Nov. 17, 2014), https://www.irs.gov/irb/2014-47_IRB/ar14.html [https://perma.cc/ 
VD58-9H66] (table 3, sec. 1(c) and table 1, sec. 1(a)). The $37,450 cap on 15% Tax Rate for singles 
increases to $74,900 for Married Filing Jointly. See id. Thus, in the 2015 tax year, there is no tax 
rate penalty for a married couple that earns $18,450 or less. But see our discussion of the earned 
income tax credit penalty in section IV.E.  
65. See INTERNAL REVENUE BULLETIN 2014-47, supra note 64. 
66. For tax year 2015, the $413,200 cap on 35% Tax Rate for singles increases to $464,850 for 
Married Filing Jointly; the $90,750 cap on 25% Tax Rate for singles increases to $151,200 for 
Married Filing Jointly. Id. 
67. Note how this discussion ignores EITC issues to focus on the broader rate bracket issues. 
EITC issues are considered below. See infra text accompanying note 190 (highlighting how our 
married calculated separate approach can easily address EITC issues as well).  
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Finally, current law permits married couples to file separate returns, 
but this option does not allow them to avoid the penalty. This results 
because the married filing separate (MFS) brackets are simply half the 
joint allowances, rather than the full singles amounts.
68
 
In sum, current law favors couples neutrality over marital neutrality. 
Furthermore, the current approach unfortunately links penalty relief to 
bonus expansion, limiting the flexibility for change. 
II. IMPACT OF THE RECENT SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 
DEVELOPMENTS 
The extension of marital rights to same-sex couples impacts the 
classic marital tax analysis above. Section A traces same-sex marriage 
developments over time. Section B discusses why these developments 
revitalize the long-standing marriage penalty issue. Because proponents 
of change often target the elimination of joint returns, section C explains 
why such elimination is not a viable reform option. 
A. Same-Sex Marriage Developments Have Renewed the Penalty 
Relief Debate 
This section sets the stage by tracing the same-sex marriage 
developments over time. In 2003, Massachusetts became the first state to 
                                                     
68. Thus, a married couple cannot file separately to escape the same 33% bracket cap ($411,500) 
for joint and single returns because the MFS cap is just $205,750 (i.e., half of $411,500). Currently, 
married couples should only use the MFS status in limited cases such as where one spouse has all 
the couple’s unreimbursed medical expenses (allowable under I.R.C. § 213 only to the extent above 
10% of the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income). Even then, the extra deduction must be balanced by 
the potential higher rate where the spouses have uneven earnings. Assume a 20% rate bracket cap of 
$100,000 for singles and $150,000 for joint returns (with a 30% rate thereafter). The MFS bracket 
equals just $75,000 (i.e., half of $150,000). Consider Evan and Eva, each with $150,000 income. If 
they marry and file jointly, a $5,000 marriage penalty arises since only $150,000 would qualify for 
the lower 20% rate, rather than the $200,000 if they just cohabited. (This $50,000 shortfall generates 
an extra $5,000 tax when multiplied by a 10% higher tax rate.) The MFS option provides no relief 
since the 20% rate still would apply to just $150,000 in total ($75,000 each). MFS might make 
sense for them, though, if Evan had all of the couple’s $30,000 qualified medical expenses. If Evan 
and Eva file a joint return, none of the unreimbursed medical expenses would qualify for the 
deduction since the $30,000 does not exceed the 10% threshold. Filing separately, though, might 
liberate some of the medical expenses, since the $30,000 could exceed the 10% threshold based 
solely on Evan’s income. Any such deduction liberation must be balanced against potential rate 
increases if the spouses have uneven income. To see this, ignore the medical expenses and assume 
Evan generated all of the couple’s $300,000 aggregate income. A separate filing would be adverse 
as only $75,000 would qualify for the lower 20% rate. For further discussion of the limitations of 
MFS, see David Mitchell, An Unhappy Union: Married Taxpayers Filing Separately and the 
Affordable Care Act’s Premium Tax Credit, 69 TAX L. 453 (2016). 
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 By 2012, six states and the District of 
Columbia had legalized same-sex marriage and another nine states 
allowed same-sex civil unions or domestic partnerships.
70
 Although 
same-sex couples in these states could file joint state income tax 
returns,
71
 they could not file joint federal tax returns
72
 because the 
federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) defined marriage as between 
one man and one woman.
73
 The Supreme Court struck down this portion 
of DOMA in Windsor v. United States,
74
 thereby allowing married same-
sex couples to file joint federal returns. After Windsor, however, some 
states still refused to solemnize same-sex marriages or even to recognize 
same-sex marriages from other states.
75
 
The Supreme Court eliminated these inconsistencies in Obergefell v. 
Hodges. Obergefell held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment required all states to allow same-sex marriages.
76
 In holding 
that same-sex couples have a fundamental right to marry, the Court 
discussed “four principles and traditions . . . demonstrat[ing] that the 
reasons marriage is fundamental under the Constitution apply with equal 
force to same-sex couples.”77 These principles are: “the right to personal 
choice regarding marriage is inherent in the concept of individual 
                                                     
69.  Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). For a history of the quest 
for same-sex marriage equality before Goodridge, see, e.g., Edward Stein, The Story of Goodridge 
v. Department of Public Health: The Bumpy Road to Marriage for Same-Sex Couples, in FAMILY 
LAW STORIES 27 (Carol Sanger, ed., 2007). 
70. Edward Stein, The Topography of Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships, 50 FAM. CT. 
REV. 181, 181 (2012). 
71. Smith & Stein, supra note 27, at 48–52. 
72. See id. at 41–46. As discussed therein, this created a peculiar situation whereby a married 
same-sex couple was required to file state taxes as a married couple but had to file federal taxes as a 
single person.  
73. Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012) and 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1738C (2012)). 
74. United States v. Windsor, __ U.S. __, 133 S.Ct. 2675, 2695 (2013). The facts of Windsor are 
as follows: Edith Windsor, whose same-sex spouse had passed away, was required to pay estate tax 
on her wife’s estate because, due to DOMA, the federal government did not recognize same-sex 
marriages. Windsor would not have had to pay any estate tax had she been married to a man (or if 
she was a man and her spouse was a woman). 
75. This created a reverse peculiarity where some married couples who filed joint federal returns 
had to file separately for state purposes. See, e.g., Haniya H. Mir, Note, Windsor and Its 
Discontents: State Income Tax Implications for Same-Sex Couples, 64 DUKE L. J. 53, 74–77 (2014); 
Aaron M. Bernstein, Note, Are We Married? State Tax Filing Problems After Windsor, 90 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 207 (2015). 
76. Obergefell, 135 S.Ct. at 2602.  
77. Id. at 2599. 
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autonomy”;78 “the right to marry is fundamental because it supports a 
two-person union unlike any other in its importance to the committed 
individuals”;79 “the right to marry . . . safeguards children and families 
and thus draws meaning from related rights of childrearing, procreation, 
and education”;80 “marriage is a keystone of our social order” and “[f]or 
that reason, . . . society pledge[s] to support the couple, offering 
symbolic recognition and material benefits to protect and nourish the 
union.”81 
The Court’s four principles further develop the idea of marriage as a 
fundamental right.
82
 As we argue below, Obergefell, in contrast to what 
some commentators have said, does not support the elimination of the 
joint return; in fact, Obergefell supports both penalty relief and the 
retention of the joint return. As part of our discussion, we highlight, for 
instance, how the tax law frequently provides beneficial tax results in 
furtherance of societal goals.
83
 
B. Obergefell Renews Call for Marital Penalty Relief 
This section explains why Obergefell and Windsor have led to 
renewed calls for marital penalty relief, often through joint return 
elimination.
84
 First, Obergefell has placed the penalty back in the 
spotlight because more couples can now marry. Relatedly, same-sex 
couples seem more likely to face the marriage penalty. As discussed 
                                                     
78. Id. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. at 2600. 
81. Id. at 2601. 
82. The Supreme Court, in its landmark 1967 decision in Loving v. Virginia, held that “[m]arriage 
is one of the basic civil rights of man” (quotation omitted) and that “[t]he freedom to marry has long 
been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by 
free men.” 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). Between Loving and Obergefell, the two most important cases on 
the fundamental right to marry are Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) and Turner v. Safley, 
482 U.S. 78 (1987). 
83. See infra note 96 and accompanying text.  
84. See, e.g., Margaret Ryznar, Fixing the Marriage Penalty, HUFFINGTON POST, (Oct. 14, 2015, 
12:21 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/margaret-ryznar/fixing-the-marriage-penal_b_8290820 
.html [https://perma.cc/QN7C-ASC4] (noting that problematic marriage penalty has impacted even 
more couples after Obergefell); Kahng, Not-So-Merry Wives, supra note 8 at 383 (“However, 
Windsor, and now Obergefell, will fail to deliver on the promise of tax equality unless we relinquish 
the fiction of marital unity”). Kahng, Marriage Tax Hurts, supra note 8; Murray & Ventry, supra 
note 7; Ed McCaffery, The Marriage Penalty Was Never Fair, and Is Now Just Silly, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 14, 2013, 7:01 PM), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/04/14/improving-on-the-
tax-codes-marriage-penalty/the-marriage-penalty-was-never-fair-and-is-now-just-silly [https:// 
perma.cc/T5YR-QB2Y].  
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above, the marriage penalty primarily impacts relatively even-earner 
couples.
85
 Note that gender tends to correlate with income. For full-time 
employment, at least, men generally earn more than women.
86
 Further, a 
greater percentage of men work as compared to women: approximately 
70% versus 57%.
87
 These gender disparities suggest that same-sex 
spouses are more likely to earn similar amounts. Two studies lend 
further support on grounds that same-sex relationships are more likely to 
have two wage earners.
88
 
Separately, Obergefell challenges the propriety of penalizing the 
fundamental right to marriage. Recall, for instance, the Court’s fourth 
principle that “marriage is a keystone of our social order” and “[f]or that 
reason, . . . society pledge[s] to support the couple, offering symbolic 
recognition and material benefits to protect and nourish the union.”89 
Significant marital tax increases directly contradict this principle. 
C. Penalty Relief by Excising Joint Returns? 
Given Obergefell’s impetus for penalty relief, how should our tax 
system implement such change? As noted above, some reformers 
propose the elimination of the joint return as the appropriate response. 
Joint return elimination (JRE) appeals initially, as it removes all 
penalties and bonuses. JRE achieves pure marital neutrality since 
marriage would not impact one’s tax bill. Rather, all individuals would 
pay the same tax regardless of their marital status. 
                                                     
85. See supra text accompanying notes 2–3. 
86. For example, according to a United States Bureau of Labor Statistics report in 2013, on 
average, women working full time in the United States earned 82% of what men working full time 
in the United States earned. See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, WOMEN IN 
THE LABOR FORCE: A DATABOOK 1 (Dec. 2014), http://www.bls.gov/opub/reports/cps/women-in-
the-labor-force-a-databook-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/JL4X-59FA].  
87. Id.  
88. See GARY J. GATES, THE WILLIAMS INSTITUTE, SAME-SEX AND DIFFERENT-SEX COUPLES IN 
THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY: 2005–2011 (2013), http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-
content/uploads/ACS-2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/QHM8-VHM2]; James Alm et al., Revisiting the 
Income Tax Effects of Legalizing Same-Sex Marriages, 33 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 263 
(2014). Further, a study of the U.S. Census Bureau published in 2012 indicates that unmarried 
same-sex couples are more likely to both be earning income compared to married different-sex 
couples. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CHARACTERISTICS OF SAME SEX HOUSEHOLDS: 2012 (2012), 
www.census.gov/hhes/samesex/files/ssex-tables-2012.xls [https://perma.cc/C2WC-2HVH]. This 
same study shows that unmarried same-sex couples earn more on average than married different-sex 
couples. Based in part on these two studies, Lily Kahng has argued that couples consisting of two 
women are more likely than other couples to be subject to the marriage penalty. Kahng, Not-So-
Merry Wives, supra note 8, at 337–43. 
89. Obergefell v. Hodges, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2601 (2015). 
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Despite this initial appeal, we believe that JRE fails as an appropriate 
reform for five reasons. As developed more fully below, the first four 
reasons stem from JRE’s termination of all current bonuses: transitional 
concerns, political viability, the desire to encourage marriage, and the 
propriety of a tax reduction for certain married couples. Finally, we 
show why Obergefell and Windsor generally strengthen, rather than 
weaken, the case for marriage as a relevant tax factor. 
1. Bonus Elimination Concerns 
Consider first the concerns related to bonus elimination. A tax 
reduction for highly uneven-earner couples appeals under the income 
tax’s “ability to pay” norm.90 Taxes are based on income because one’s 
ability to pay correlates with income. Recall married couple Dina and 
Virgil, where Dina earned all of the couple’s $200,000 income. Let’s 
compare Dina to Ingrid, an unmarried individual who also earns 
$200,000. All else equal, Dina has a lesser ability to pay than Ingrid 
since Dina’s $200,000 supports two individuals.91 JRE disregards Dina 
and Virgil’s resource sharing—a complete rejection of couples 
neutrality. 
Two practical concerns bolster the theoretic support above for joint 
return retention. First, transition issues arise because the current system 
has provided significant tax reductions for many years. For instance, 
some taxpayers may have previously married based in part on ingrained 
marital bonuses. JRE would strip the marital benefit from those who 
married with such benefit in place.
92
 Somewhat related, JRE raises 
                                                     
90. Reasoning conversely, marriage penalties likewise might seem justified for equal-earning 
couples due to economies of scale. See supra note 51 and text accompanying notes 51–52. While 
there is some truth to this proposition, marriage penalties raise separate concerns. Recall for 
instance the discussion in section II.B about how Obergefell opposes a tax charge on the exercise of 
the fundamental marriage right. 
91. Of course, marriage may provide non-pecuniary benefits to those who marry that could offset 
the marriage penalty. That said, the tax code, for better or worse, generally assesses taxes based on 
economic factors. Consider, for example, a highly compensated lawyer who leaves the practice of 
law for a teaching job in academia because the academic job provides greater personal satisfaction. 
The tax code nonetheless taxes the practicing lawyer more heavily than the law teacher.  
92. As noted above, disproportionate-earner couples receive bonuses. See supra section II.C. 
While tax law changes are always part of the landscape (e.g., tax rate shifts over time), a complete 
elimination of bonuses without any transitional relief seems more problematic (e.g., from a tax 
planning perspective). For a general discussion of tax transitional policy issues, see, e.g., Michael 
Doran, Legislative Compromise and Tax Transition Policy, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 545 (2007). 
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political feasibility issues. It seems highly unlikely that Congress would 
excise all tax marital bonuses, a seemingly anti-marriage position.
93
 
These transitional and political concerns link to an incentive-based 
argument for tax bonuses. Obergefell emphasizes marriage’s long-term 
value for couples and their children.
94
 This provides additional theoretic 
support for retention of marital tax bonuses: a tax incentive to undertake 
an activity with long-term benefits.
95
 The tax code provides such 
inducements in a number of areas, such as retirement savings tax 
breaks.
96
 This closely aligns with Carl Schneider’s influential article on 
the channeling function of family law.
97
 Governments provide many 
non-tax benefits designed to encourage marriage.
98
 In this spirit, tax 
bonuses tend to benefit divergent-earner couples like Dina and Virgil. 
Such a tax bonus might offset the potential reluctance of a high-earner 
like Dina to commit to a marriage. 
2. Obergefell Strengthens Case for Marriage as Tax Proxy 
Obergefell and Windsor also support joint return retention for another 
reason. Under prior law, same-sex couples could not access the marital 
                                                     
93. Recall how all the 2016 presidential candidates’ reform proposals maintain joint return filing. 
See supra note 20.  
94. See, e.g., Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600 (“Marriage responds to the universal fear that a lonely 
person might call out only to find no one there. It offers the hope of companionship and 
understanding and assurance that while both still live there will be someone to care for the other.”); 
id. at 2600–01 (“Excluding same-sex couples from marriage thus conflicts with a central premise of 
the right to marry. Without the recognition, stability, and predictability marriage offers, their 
children suffer the stigma of knowing their families are somehow lesser. They also suffer the 
significant material costs of being raised by unmarried parents, relegated through no fault of their 
own to a more difficult and uncertain family life. The marriage laws at issue here thus harm and 
humiliate the children of same-sex couples.”). 
95. In this same spirit, continued joint filing might support valuable financial collaboration. See 
infra discussion in Part III.B and Part IV.C. To this extent, we have highlighted a sixth adverse 
factor of JRE. 
96. These tax benefits are referred to as “tax expenditures” under the framework developed by 
Stanley Surrey and Paul McDaniel. See generally STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R. MCDANIEL, TAX 
EXPENDITURES (1985). One might wonder why the tax system should incentivize behavior in one’s 
self interest. State paternalism can be justified because individuals do not always act in their own 
long-term interests. Also, parents do not always act to further their child’s interests. A focus on 
children’s interests might suggest marital benefits just for couples with children, or more radically, a 
refocusing of family law on the nurturing relationship, as suggested by Martha Fineman. See, e.g., 
MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY, AND OTHER 
TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995). Perhaps, though, we might want to encourage marriage 
for childless couples to increase their willingness to parent together.  
97. Carl Scheider, The Channelling Function in Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV 495 (1992). 
98. See supra note 26. 
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tax benefit available to heterosexual couples.
99
 Such unequal access 
presented a fairness challenge to the use of marriage as a tax factor. But 
Obergefell and Windsor erased this discrimination critique. Marriage 
may not be a perfect proxy for joint taxation of individuals on resource-
sharing grounds,
100
 but it now operates as a much improved tax proxy 
after Obergefell.
101
 This counters the JRE claim that marriage should no 
longer be a tax factor after Obergefell. 
3. Summary 
Obergefell influences the marital penalty debate in two ways. First, it 
solidifies the use of marriage as a relevant tax factor by eradicating a 
discriminatory impact on same-sex couples. Through its “marriage as a 
fundamental right” analysis, Obergefell also justifies a new split 
approach to the two marriage neutrality components. Current reform 
efforts should target marital penalties but not marital bonuses since 
government policy should incentivize, rather than discourage, 
marriage.
102
 Transitional and political concerns further support this new 
bifurcated approach to marriage neutrality.
103
 
III. PENALTY RELIEF PROPOSALS 
Thus far, we have made the case for marital penalty relief without the 
simultaneous elimination of all marital bonuses. Section II.C highlighted 
one way to accomplish that goal: expand the joint brackets to twice the 
                                                     
99. See, e.g., Smith & Stein, supra note 27 at 30. 
100. In fact, some cohabiting couples might share resources at least as much as some married 
couples. Further, people in group “marriages” (that is, when three or more individuals are together 
in a marriage-like relationship) may share resources as least as much as married couples. These 
relationships are not legally recognized, however. For a detailed discussion of group and plural 
marriages, see RONALD C. DEN OTTER, IN DEFENSE OF PLURAL MARRIAGE 251–54 (2015). See 
contra JOHN WITTE, JR., THE WESTERN CASE FOR MONOGAMY OVER POLYGAMY (2015). See also, 
Edward Stein, Plural Marriage, Group Marriage and Immutability in Obergefell v. Hodges and 
Beyond, 84 UMKC L. REV. 871 (2016).  
101. While not related to Obergefell, further note how marriage is a more readily identifiable 
marker for resource sharing than cohabitation. For a discussion of the discrimination critique prior 
to Obergefell, see e.g., Patricia Cain, Heterosexual Privilege and the Internal Revenue Code, 34 
U.S.F. L. REV. 465 (2000).  
102. Thus, we ultimately advocate a proposal that severs penalty reduction from bonus 
elimination. Ryznar, supra note 20, similarly favors penalty relief without bonus elimination. For 
discussion of Ryznar’s proposal, see infra text accompanying notes 111–117.  
103. This ignores for the moment, the adverse revenue implications of such a split approach. 
Revenue concerns will be addressed below. See infra section III.B. 
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 In fact, Donald Trump has proposed this exact form 
of penalty relief as part of his presidential candidacy.
105
 But section II.C 
also highlighted an undesirable side effect: the significant simultaneous 
increase of the current marital bonuses. This creates significant revenue 
concerns due to the dual loss from both penalty relief and bonus 
expansion.
106
 And while Part III made the case for bonus retention, it did 
not necessarily support such a dramatic increase to the current bonus 
levels. 
Is there then a way to provide penalty relief without the revenue loss 
associated with bonus expansion? This Part considers three proposals in 
this spirit.
107
 Section A considers Margaret Ryznar’s recent refined 
doubled-bracket approach that grants the doubled brackets to just even-
earner couples.
108
 While this proposal has some intriguing features, it 
suffers from an undesirable cliff effect.
109
 
Section B reviews a 1997 legislative proposal. This “optional singles 
filing” approach would have permitted married couples who file 
separately to use the regular singles brackets rather than just half the 
joint bracket. Despite its initial appeal, its unbridled penalty relief 
maintains revenue and other concerns.
110
 
Section C then examines former presidential candidate Jeb Bush’s 
hybrid approach that would tax (i) the wages of the lower-earning 
spouse under the separate singles brackets, and (ii) the couple’s 
remaining income under the regular joint brackets. While this approach 
also intrigues, we show how it provides overly generous allowances. 
                                                     
104. See supra text accompanying notes 57–58. 
105. See Donald Trump’s proposal, supra note 25 (narrowing the number of brackets and then 
providing a doubled amount for joint returns). See also Bobby Jindal’s proposal and Rick 
Santorum’s proposal, supra note 25. 
106. Note the extreme focus today on revenue implications as evidenced by the inability to excise 
the alternative minimum tax despite widespread dissatisfaction with its application. See, e.g., Aviva 
Aron-Dine, Revenue Losses from Repeal of the Alternative Minimum Tax Are Staggering, CENTER 
ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, (Feb. 1, 2007), http://www.cbpp.org/research/revenue-losses-
from-repeal-of-the-alternative-minimum-tax-are-staggering [https://perma.cc/QGX2-FXPB].  
107. We focus on these proposals as we are not aware of any other penalty relief proposals that 
also satisfy our goal of bonus retention without significant bonus expansion.  
108. The goal is to limit the relief to just those who suffer the most egregious marriage penalties. 
See Ryznar, supra note 21.  
109. As discussed below, it also maintains some undesirable entanglement of penalty relief with 
bonus expansion.  
110. Of the three prior proposals considered in this Part, we believe this one comes closest to the 
mark. As discussed in section III.B and Part IV, however, we believe we can improve upon this 
proposal. In particular, our alternative approach better balances revenue concerns and a desire to 
maintain the collaborative aspect of joint filing. 
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A. Refined Doubled Bracket 
Ryznar’s recent proposal offers a refined version of doubled brackets 
in order to “alleviate[] the current marriage penalty . . . [without] 
creating an even bigger marriage bonus” for uneven-earner couples.111 
More specifically, Ryznar proposes doubling the brackets but only for 
(roughly) equal-earner couples. To qualify for the doubled brackets, the 
lower-earner spouse would have to earn a designated percentage of the 
couple’s aggregate income, somewhere in the 30%–40% range.112 This 
proposal has some initial appeal as it (i) eliminates the most extreme 
marriage penalties, (ii) maintains the current bonuses, and (iii) does not 
provide new bonuses for highly uneven earners. Despite such initial 
appeal, Ryznar’s proposal suffers from a serious cliff effect, namely it 
ends abruptly. Specifically, as illustrated below, Ryznar’s cliff effect is 
the abrupt loss of the higher bracket allowance when the couple’s 
income falls just outside the qualifying range. To see this, imagine 
Ryznar’s low-earner qualifying threshold is set at 35%.113 Again, assume 
the following brackets for the lower 20% rate: $100,000 for singles, and 
$130,000 for married couples. Finally, consider married couple Lois and 
Heidi, where Lois earns $60,000 of the joint $200,000 income. Since 
Lois earns just 30% of their income, Lois and Heidi would be denied any 
relief from their $3,000 marital penalty.
114
 As further demonstrated in a 
comparison to our alternative proposal below, the cliff effect problem is 
not so much the lack of any penalty relief to Lois and Heidi. Rather, 
small shifts in the reported income allocation between the spouses could 
generate disproportionately large shifts in their tax bill.
115
 And while 
lowering the threshold to 30% would protect Lois and Heidi, the cliff 
effect would persist for couples just below the 30% threshold. 
In addition to its undesirable cliff effect, Ryznar’s approach would 
still provide some undesired new bonuses. For example, a lower 30% 
threshold would not only eliminate Lois and Heidi’s penalty, but it 
                                                     
111. Ryznar, supra note 21, at 22.  
112. Id. at 23.  
113. This splits her 30–40% suggested range. 
114. Lois and Heidi still must pay the higher 30% tax rate on $70,000 of their marital income, the 
excess of the joint $200,000 income over the regular joint allowance of $130,000. They would pay 
the higher rate on just a lower $40,000 if they cohabited instead (the excess of the high-earner’s 
$140,000 over the $100,000 singles amount). Further note how the penalty amount would increase 
if the regular joint bracket amount was set at less than 130% of the singles bracket (which occurs 
currently at higher levels); and would decrease if the regular joint bracket amount was set at more 
than 130% of the singles bracket (which occurs currently at lower bracket levels).  
115. See infra discussion at note 151 and accompanying text.  
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would provide them a new $4,000 bonus. This results from the lower 
20% rate applying to all their income rather than just $160,000 if they 
cohabitated without marriage.
116
 Thus, Ryznar’s penalty relief remains 
linked to bonus expansion unless it strictly requires an even 50% split. 
Given these two shortcomings, we look elsewhere in our quest for 
penalty relief without any bonus impact or a cliff effect.
117
 
B. Optional Singles Filing 
Interestingly, our search takes us back to a 1997 legislative proposal 
that granted married couples the option to file separately and use the 
unmarried single brackets.
118
 On the plus side, optional singles filing 
(OSF) would eliminate all penalties without any impact on bonuses or a 
cliff effect. Its implementation also would be relatively 
straightforward.
119
 Despite these significant virtues, several 
shortcomings reduce its attractiveness as a reform proposal. 
Most significantly, OSF removes all marital penalties, regardless of 
how small. This results because any currently penalized couple simply 
should take the OSF option. While such indiscriminate relief appeals in 
theory, it raises practical revenue concerns. In favorable contrast, Ryznar 
rations the penalty relief to just the most highly penalized couples.
120
 To 
illustrate, recall how Ryznar’s approach would not provide any penalty 
relief to Lois and Heidi.
121
 With OSF, Lois and Heidi could eliminate the 
penalty by opting to file separately.
122
 
                                                     
116. The proposal also raises some other concerns, although these might be more easily remedied 
through additional adjustments. For instance, the proposal would restore an advantage to residents 
of community property states, who would more readily qualify for the doubled brackets than 
residents of other states. This might be addressed by special rules that ignored community property 
rules on earned income, for example. This also might invite voluntary transfers of capital income to 
get the expanded bracket, although one might argue that incentivizing such transfers would be good 
to do from a marital sharing perspective. This assumes that investment income would be included in 
the percentage ratio (this is not clear based on our reading of Ryznar’s proposal). See infra section 
IV.D for a discussion of possible solutions to the community property and capital income shifting 
issues in a comparable context. 
117. See infra section IV.D for a discussion of a possible modification to Ryznar’s approach that 
would solve the cliff problem, albeit at a significant administrative cost.  
118. H.R. 2456, 105th Cong. § 2 (1st Sess. 1997); S. 1314, 105th Cong. § 2 (1st Sess. 1997). 
119. Taxpayers would just choose between two existing bracket calculations. 
120. Although, again, it might not achieve this very efficiently due to higher bonuses as the low-
earner’s qualifying percentage drops below 50%. See infra section IV.B. 
121. See supra notes 114–115. Again, this assumes a 35% threshold, splitting Ryznar’s range. 
122. By filing separately, $160,000 would be taxed at the lower rate ($60,000 for Lois and 
$100,000 for Heidi), the same as if they just cohabitated.  
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In addition, OSF also presents another less obvious concern. Separate 
filing might subtly undermine the joint financial collaboration 
highlighted above.
123
 For instance, joint returns carry joint and several 
liability for the married couple.
124
 
In sum, the OSF and Ryznar proposals contain divergent drawbacks. 
OSF presents revenue concerns and a subtle undermining of the joint 
planning virtue. Ryznar contains a cliff effect problem plus some 
undesirable bonus-penalty linkage. Further note how each proposal 
would restore two vestigial concerns from the days prior to joint 
returns.
125
 First, community property residents would receive tax breaks 
since their income generally would be shared equally.
126
 Second, the tax 
law would encourage taxpayers in non-community property jurisdictions 
to attempt such shifts through contractual sharing arrangements.
127
 (In 
fairness to these proposals, note that the elimination of joint returns also 
implicates these concerns.) With these issues in mind, we next consider 
Jeb Bush’s reform proposal. 
C. Jeb Bush’s Hybrid Proposal 
Jeb Bush’s proposal permits the lower wage-earner to file as a single, 
but only for such spouse’s earned income.128 All other joint income 
would be taxed under the regular joint return brackets. This includes the 
high-earner’s wages and all of the couple’s investment income. While 
this proposal also has some intriguing aspects,
129
 it provides unjustified 
bonuses by giving dual-earner families more than twice the single 
bracket amounts. This occurs because Bush’s joint brackets are larger 
than the singles bracket. Thus, a dual-earner couple could receive the 
                                                     
123. See supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
124. I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3) (2012). Married taxpayers who file separately do not have such joint and 
several liability. Under joint and several liability, both spouses are each responsible for any and all 
tax deficiencies attributable to either spouse. Note that there is an exception for “innocent” spouses. 
I.R.C. § 6015; see also INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., Examining Officers Guide: Innocent Spouse, 
https://www.irs.gov/irm/part4/irm_04-011-034.html [https://perma.cc/N337-Z5AK]. 
125. See supra text accompanying notes 30–33.  
126. See supra section I.A. 
127. Id. 
128. See Jeb Bush’s tax proposal, supra note 25. Note that earned income references income from 
labor efforts (e.g., wages), as opposed to investment income (e.g., dividends from stock 
investments).  
129. See infra section IV.C. 
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To illustrate, assume again the following brackets for the lower 20% 
rate: $100,000 for singles, and $130,000 for married couples. Consider a 
married couple where Lowell earns $100,000 of wages while Hi earns 
$500,000 compensation. Under Bush’s approach, $230,000 would 
qualify for the lower 20% rate: $100,000 on Lowell’s separate return 
plus $130,000 on the joint return. This would provide Hi and Lowell a 
$3,000 windfall as only $200,000 would qualify for the lower rate if they 
cohabitated. 
In sum, these three existing proposals contain some intriguing aspects 
but each suffers from serious drawbacks. We next demonstrate a way to 
capture their benefits without their drawbacks. 
IV. MARRIED CALCULATED SEPARATE APPROACH 
We believe that a modified separate approach provides the best 
pathway to meaningful reform. Most significantly, the separate marital 
brackets generally should be higher than their current levels, but lower 
than the singles amounts. This key adjustment gives greater flexibility to 
better balance all the competing values.
131
 
Section A shows how our approach neatly disentangles marital 
penalties from marital bonuses. This separation allows an independent 
consideration of the desired penalty relief and the optimal bonus 
amounts. Section B then demonstrates why our new approach provides 
better penalty relief rationing than the 1997 legislative proposal and the 
Ryznar proposal. Section C discusses additional improvements to the 
1997 proposal, such as the aggregation of the separate spousal tax 
amounts on a joint return, a married calculated separate (MCS) 
approach. Section C also considers possible variations on our main idea. 
Section D next analyzes the prior criticism of the 1997 proposal for any 
possible relevance to our approach. This section demonstrates how our 
modifications and the current legal developments negate such relevance. 
Finally, section E provides guidelines for setting the separate marital and 
the regular joint bracket amounts. 
                                                     
130. See Martin Feldstein, A Tax Boon for Working Women: Jeb Bush’s Tax Reform Proposal 
Ends the “Marriage Penalty” by Allowing Spouses to File Separately, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 5, 2015, 
7:16 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/a-tax-boon-for-working-women-1444087005 [https://perma. 
cc/G938-QZTV] (stating specifically that the couple would be able to use the joint brackets for the 
remaining income).  
131. These values include revenue, transitional, and political feasibility concerns.  
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A. Disentanglement of Penalties and Bonuses 
Joint return elimination would excise all bonuses in addition to 
penalties, raising the variety of concerns highlighted above.
132
 
Alternatively, higher married brackets likewise would provide penalty 
relief, albeit with limited flexibility due to the corollary bonus 
expansion. In favorable contrast, our MCS proposal neatly disentangles 
penalties and bonuses. This provides maximum flexibility to determine 
the most optimal mix of penalties and bonuses. 
To set the stage, recall our earlier illustration of the inherent tension 
between penalties and bonuses under the current joint return approach.
133
 
We assumed a simple two-bracket structure for unmarried individuals 
with a 20% rate on the first $100,000 of income and a 30% rate 
thereafter.
134
 Under the current approach, marriage penalties arise absent 
a $200,000 joint bracket cap for the 20% rate. Eva and Evan would face 
a marital penalty at any lesser amount since each earned $100,000 
separately.
135
 But such $200,000 allowance also would provide the 
maximum $10,000 bonus to Dina and Virgil, as Dina earned all of the 
couples’ $200,000 income.136 Application of the low $100,000 singles 
cap to joint returns would eliminate the bonus. However, this would then 
maximize Eva and Evan’s penalty at $10,000.137 
The other extreme of keeping the joint 20% bracket at the same 
$100,000 for singles further illustrates this inherent tension and 
entanglement of marriage penalty relief with potentially undesirable 
bonus expansion. This alternate end of the continuum would eliminate 
                                                     
132. See supra section II.C. 
133. See supra section I.C illustration. Note that by the current joint return approach, we mean 
joint returns without any meaningful separate returns. The current approach does allow separate 
returns but without any penalty rate bracket relief since the current married filing separate brackets 
are half the joint brackets, not the unmarried single amount. See supra note 68 and accompanying 
text. 
134. The simple two-bracket structure is assumed for ease of exposition; the conceptual points are 
not altered by this simplified structure. Further, we set to the side issues related to the head of 
household status in order to focus on the primary rate bracket issues. Head of household issues can 
be dealt with separately after working out the primary core structural issues. For a discussion of the 
head of household issue, see Zelenak, supra note 22, at 68–74. 
135. This results because they could receive the lower 20% rate on a full $200,000 aggregate 
income if they cohabited instead of married. 
136. They would receive the benefit of the lower 20% rate on an extra $100,000 of income (i.e., 
the full amount of the singles bracket). We have set aside the seemingly unsupported possibility that 
the joint return bracket should be even greater than twice the single bracket. 10% rate difference x 
$100,000 = $10,000. 
137. They would now face the higher 30% rate on an additional $100,000 of income if they 
married. 10% rate difference x $100,000 = $10,000. 
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all bonuses but only with the corollary consequence of maximizing the 
penalty potential. Consider now an equal-earner couple, Larry and 
Laura, who each earn $100,000 of income. They would now face the 
higher 30% rate on an additional $100,000 of income if they married. 
Contrast this with our MCS proposal. Penalty relief would be 
provided through expanded separate married brackets. For complete 
elimination, the brackets should match the unmarried single amount of 
$100,000. But mindful of other concerns,
138
 partial relief could be 
achieved by setting the bracket amount below $100,000 but above 
$50,000.
139
 Importantly, incremental bracket increases would lessen 
penalties without increasing bonuses. This disentanglement of penalties 
and bonuses has several important virtues. First, such separation enables 
a singular focus on the optimal amount of penalty relief unburdened by 
any corollary impact on bonuses. As discussed below, the penalty relief 
thus could vary at different income levels.
140
 Somewhat related, the 
revenue loss from penalty reduction would be limited to the direct 
penalty relief, without additional lost amounts from new bonuses. 
In similar fashion, any desired marriage bonuses could be maintained 
separately through the joint marital brackets. Again, the ideal joint 
bracket amounts could be set with a singular focus on just the desired 
bonus level without concern about undesirable penalties from lower 
allowances. Similar to the penalty side, the bonus amount could vary at 
different income levels.
141
 In other words, the combined system would 
encourage separate calculations by potential penalty candidates and joint 
calculations by potential bonus candidates. 
We return to our example to illustrate these points. Assume now the 
following caps for the lower 20% rate: $90,000 for the separate married 
bracket and $130,000 for the joint married bracket. The $90,000 separate 
bracket neatly eliminates most penalties without any bonus expansion. 
To see these results, consider again our two couples: Eva and Evan, and 
Dina and Virgil. Even-earners Eva and Evan should take our new option 
to calculate separately since this increases the income qualifying for the 
lower 20% rate from $130,000 under the joint bracket to $180,000.
142
 
They still would face a marriage penalty as $200,000 would qualify for 
                                                     
138. This includes revenue concerns. See supra text accompanying note 106 and text 
accompanying note 120.  
139. $50,000 is half the $100,000 joint bracket that would be used if we wanted to eliminate all 
bonuses under the current approach.  
140. See infra section IV.E.  
141. See id. 
142. Each could have $90,000 taxed at the lower rate. $90,000 x 2 = $180,000. 
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the lower 20% rate if they cohabited without marriage.
143
 Our new 
separate married bracket, however, neatly reduces the penalty to just 
$2,000.
144
 In addition, the penalty could be further limited by increasing 
the bracket above $90,000 if desired after balancing all relevant factors. 
Most importantly, our penalty relief does not contain any undesired 
corollary bonus consequences. With the $130,000 joint bracket cap, 
divergent-earners Dina and Virgil receive the same $3,000 bonus 
regardless of any increases to the married filing separate bracket.
145
 In 
similar fashion, we could change the bonus possibilities by joint bracket 
adjustments without any impact on the penalties. 
B. Better Rationing of Penalty Relief 
As discussed above, the 1997 legislative proposal eliminates penalties 
through an option to use the singles brackets. If penalty elimination were 
the only important value, this would make the most sense. Other relevant 
values should, however, be taken into account. Most recently, we 
focused on the revenue loss from the complete elimination of penalties, 
especially if coupled with full bonus retention as under the 1997 
proposal. Such revenue loss made the 1997 proposal less politically 
feasible given the significant tax reduction accorded to multiple-earner 
married couples, with this revenue loss then spread out amongst the 
remaining taxpayers. Reaching back to the original trilemma, the 1997 
proposal also gives very little weight to couples neutrality because all 
couples penalized under the joint bracket would opt out and pay 
different amounts based on the earnings breakdown between the two 
spouses. 
With these additional values in mind, rationing the penalty relief 
would improve upon the 1997 proposal’s indiscriminate relief. This 
seems to underlie Ryznar’s limited relief approach. But as discussed 
above, Ryznar’s approach rations the relief in an uneven way due to its 
cliff effect. A couple just above the qualifying line would receive full 
                                                     
143. Each could have $100,000 taxed at the lower rate (since the unmarried singles brackets 
provides the lowered tax rate on $100,000 of income).  
144. The $2,000 equals the extra 10% rate times a $20,000 shortfall. There is a $20,000 shortfall 
as only $180,000 qualifies for the lower rate instead of $200,000. Note how the penalty would rise 
to $7,000 under the $130,000 joint allowance without our new separate bracket of $90,000. This 
would result since they would face the extra 10% tax on $70,000 additional income (as just 
$130,000 would qualify for the lower rate instead of the $200,000 if they cohabitated).  
145. Unmarried, the wage earner (Richard) would receive the 10% lower rate (30% less 20%) on 
just $100,000 of income. By marrying, that figure increases by $30,000 to the $130,000 joint 
bracket allowance. Such $30,000 multiplied by the 10% rate difference equals the $3,000 bonus.  
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penalty relief and possibly a bonus as well. In contrast, the penalty 
would apply with full force to a couple just below the qualifying line. 
More favorably, our proposal provides more even-handed penalty relief 
and avoids the entanglement of penalty relief with undesired new 
bonuses. 
The following example compares our proposal to Ryznar’s approach. 
As before, assume a progressive rate structure for single taxpayers where 
income up to $100,000 is taxed at 20% with additional income taxed at 
30%. Further consider five couples with $200,000 aggregate income, 
dispersed as follows: (i) extremely uneven Richard and Regina, where 
Regina earns the full $200,000; (ii) highly uneven Thomas and Todd, 
where Thomas earns $160,000 and Todd earns only $40,000; (iii) 
moderately uneven Samantha and Sylvia, where Samantha earns 
$140,000 and Sylvia earns $60,000; (iv) relatively even Martha and 
Marvin, where Martha earns $120,000 and Marvin earns $80,000; and 
(v) perfectly even Larry and Laura, each of whom earn $100,000. 
The following table sets forth three items: (i) the marital penalty or 
bonus assuming the regular joint bracket is set at $130,000 (which can 
be thought of as the result under current law),
146
 (ii) the joint bracket 
amount necessary to avoid any penalty, and (iii) the bonus if the couple 
qualifies for the doubled joint bracket under Ryznar’s approach: 
 
  
                                                     
146. $130,000 equals 130% of the singles bracket. As discussed in section I.D, current law varies 
the multiplier at different levels with a lower multiplier at the top levels.  
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Table # 1 




















$30,000 x 10% = 
$3,000 Bonus  







$10,000 x 10% = 
$1,000 Penalty  
$140,000 $60,000 x 





$30,000 x 10% = 
$3,000 Penalty 
$160,000 $40,000 x 





$50,000 x 10% 
$5,000 Penalty 
$180,000 $20,000 x 









This table illustrates the difficult tradeoffs under Ryznar’s approach. 
Completely even Larry and Laura (at the bottom of the table) present the 
most compelling case for the doubled bracket relief. They have the 
highest penalty ($7,000) without relief and the doubled bracket would 
not provide them any bonus. But as we move up the table, the 
difficulties become more evident. If the relief applied solely to even-





                                                     
147. Another couple with a $99,000/$101,000 breakdown would be left with an even higher 
penalty of $6,900 (69,000 x 10%).  
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In response, Ryznar relaxes the perfectly even requirement to cover 
relatively even Martha and Marvin.
148
 But the doubled bracket relief 
overshoots its mark by providing them a $2,000 bonus.
149
 And once 
again, the line drawing problem persists as we must consider whether the 
relief should extend to moderately uneven Samantha and Sylvia.
150
 If so, 
the system would further overshoot its mark by providing Samantha and 
Sylvia a larger $4,000 bonus. Finally, note how a very small shift in the 
earnings could cause a much larger $7,000 change to the tax bill. A 
$1,000 shift in earnings from Samantha to Sylvia would increase their 




In sum, Ryznar’s approach raises several serious concerns. First, the 
approach contains significant tipping points from its somewhat arbitrary 
line drawing. Second, the approach overshoots its mark due to its 
continued entanglement of bonuses and penalties. Finally, the system 
must police the earnings breakdown between the spouses as small shifts 
in the reported distribution could significantly impact the tax bill. 
Now, favorably contrast our alternate married calculated separate 
approach. Let’s assume a new separate married bracket of $90,000, set 
below the $100,000 singles amount but above one-half of the joint return 
amount (i.e., $65,000). 
  
                                                     
148. Martha earns 40% of the aggregate income (80,000 = 40% x $200,000). 
149. One might say this is appropriate under couples neutrality, but Ryznar’s approach does not 
heed couples neutrality as an absolute requirement since it does cut off other couples from the 
doubled bracket.  
150. They are right on the lower end of Ryznar’s 30%–40% possibilities as Samantha earns 30% 
of the aggregate income (60,000 = 30% x $200,000).  
151. This would leave Samantha with just $59,000 of the income, equal to just 29.5%. While the 
regime could round up so that they would qualify, there still would be some (lower) line where the 
small earnings shift would cause the same larger tax shift. And such small earnings shift would 
reduce their joint bracket from the higher $200,000 to just the regular $130,000 bracket. If so, an 
additional $70,000 would be taxed at the 30% rate, a $7,000 difference. $70,000 x (30%–20%) = 
$7,000. 
07 - Engler & Stein.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/4/2016  5:10 PM 
2016] MARRIAGE PENALTY RELIEF 1105 
 
Table # 2 



































































We first summarize the results. Under our approach, the three 
intermediary couples will suffer a slight $1,000 penalty, equal to the 
extra 10% rate on $10,000 of income. This results because only the first 
$90,000 of the high-earner’s income qualifies for the lower 20% rate. 
There is no impact on the low-earner since the entire earnings fall below 
the $90,000 separate married bracket. Equal-earners Larry and Laura 
suffer a higher $2,000 penalty equal to the extra 10% rate on $20,000 of 
income. This results because each has $10,000 of income which falls 
above the $90,000 separate married bracket but below the singles 
$100,000 bracket. Nonetheless, this couple receives the largest penalty 
relief under our proposal.
152
 Further note the lack of any unfavorable 
cliff effect or entangled bonuses. 
Linking back to Ryznar’s approach, our proposal provides a better 
and more consistent rationing of the penalty relief. Our proposal also 
                                                     
152. Their penalty drops from $7,000 to $2,000, a $5,000 difference.  
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avoids Ryznar’s “leaky bucket”153 problem of unintended bonus 
increases with the corollary revenue loss. In favorable contrast again, our 
proposal disentangles penalty relief from bonuses by adjusting the 
separate married brackets rather than the joint brackets as Ryznar does. 
In addition, our proposal avoids the need to police the qualifying borders 
where small shifts can create much larger tax savings. 
In sum, our proposal improves upon the 1997 legislative proposal and 
Ryznar’s proposal by incorporating their best features and fixing their 
shortcomings. Our selective penalty relief addresses revenue concerns 
and political feasibility. In this regard, adjusting the separate married 
brackets is a less controversial change than either the elimination of joint 
returns or a new option to file as unmarried singles. Further linking to 
transitional issues, our bracket adjustments could be incorporated slowly 
over time.
154
 For instance, the separate married brackets could be 
increased piecemeal over time with similar staggered decreases to the 
joint bracket allowances. These incremental joint adjustments would 
further address revenue concerns due to their offsetting effects. Finally, 
our proposal is more consistent with couples neutrality than a complete 
scrapping of joint returns. 
C. Additional Modifications 
Our proposal could incorporate further improvements. For instance, 
MCS could disregard community property laws. First recall how 
community property law motivated the original adoption of joint returns. 
Community property couples benefited under the prior separate filing 
since the earned income was split between the two spouses.
155
 Similar 
concerns might arise under our proposal as well as other reform 
proposals.
156
 To see this, return to the earlier example with the 20% rate 
                                                     
153. See ARTHUR OKUN, EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY: THE BIG TRADEOFF 91–95 (1975) (using a 
leaky bucket metaphor to explain inefficient tax losses while trying achieve fair tax results).  
154. While other proposals could also phase in changes over time, our proposal has the additional 
flexibility to independently coordinate penalty relief with any bonus impact (e.g., by adjusting the 
separate brackets before the joint brackets or vice versa). 
155. See supra text accompanying notes 30–33. 
156. The same issue arises under the 1997 proposal for the same reasons as under our proposal 
because the income shifting would induce the ability to generate benefits by filing separate. 
Consider in this regard the textual example in this paragraph with the only difference being that the 
benefits would be even greater under the 1997 proposal as it would allow each spouse to use the full 
singles bracket. A version of this issue also arises under Ryznar’s proposal since community 
property couples could more readily qualify for her equal-earner status. Finally, joint return 
elimination would restore full force this issue as it would take us back to the time prior to joint 
returns.  
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cap set at $130,000 for the joint bracket and $90,000 for the MCS 
bracket. Compare now two highly uneven earner couples where one 
spouse in each case earns all of the couples’ $200,000 income. Richard 
and Regina live in a separate property state while Nancy and Nathan live 
in a community property state. Nancy and Nathan would receive a tax 
break compared to Richard and Regina if community property laws were 
taken into account under the classic case of Poe v. Seaborn.
157
 If so, 
Nancy and Nathan each would report $100,000 under the MCS option, 
with $180,000 total taxed at the lower 20% rate.
158
 
The response to this problem is easy enough: provide that the new 
MCS brackets would ignore the impact of community property laws.
159
 
More generally, the MCS brackets likewise could ignore other attempted 
income shifts outside of community property principles. Consider, for 
instance, how a separated system provides incentives to place investment 
assets in the hands of the lower-earner spouse.
160
 In response, the tax 
system could continue to tax the donor spouse on income generated from 
wealth transfers to the other spouse.
161
 
Jeb Bush’s proposal162 incorporates this notion by permitting only the 
low wage-earning spouse’s actual earnings to be taxed under the single 
brackets. As noted previously,
163
 the remainder of the couple’s income 
(compensation of the high-earner plus the couple’s entire capital 
income) would be taxed under the regular joint return brackets. While 
this aspect is a virtue, as noted above, the proposal provides unjustified 
bonuses by allowing a dual-earner family to get more than twice the 
                                                     
157. 282 U.S. 101 (1930). 
158. Under Poe, each spouse in an appropriate community property jurisdiction would report half 
the earnings regardless of which spouse generated the compensation. With each spouse reporting 
$100,000 separate income, Nancy and Nathan each could qualify $90,000 for the lower rate under 
the MCS brackets. $90,000 x 2 = $180,000. In contrast, Richard and Regina would file jointly 
without the income split, qualifying only $130,000 for the lower rate. Id. 
159. Note that this would not limit the penalty relief since the community property split arises 
only on the act of marriage itself (and so the results are no worse than if the couple did not marry).  
160. By shifting investment income to such lower bracket spouse, the couple would report the 
income more evenly (with tax savings under the progressive rate structure).  
161. Since marital penalties are the impetus for the MCS brackets, the system need not open up 
tax reporting gaps unrelated to such motivation for the change in law. Note that Canada, which does 
not utilize joint return filing, takes this approach. See Tom McFeat, 6 Ways Income Splitting Could 
Cut Your Tax Bill, CANADIAN BROADCASTING CORP. (Mar. 1, 2012, 8:40 AM), 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/business/taxes/6-ways-income-splitting-could-cut-your-tax-bill-1.1218592 
[https://perma.cc/274U-95PP]. Further note how Jeb Bush’s proposal neatly renders irrelevant such 
attempted shifts on investment income (since the couple’s investment income remains aggregated 
on a joint return with the separation related solely to labor income). See supra note 128.  
162. See supra section III.C. 
163. See supra text accompanying notes 118–120. 
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 This defect could be remedied with some 
additional complexity by reducing the joint bracket allowances by the 
separately reported wage income.
165
 In addition, revenue concerns could 
be addressed by capping the separate wages bracket at less than the 
singles bracket amount, just like our MCS option. Alternatively, the 
system could encapsulate all this within the joint brackets by increasing 
the joint bracket amount by the lower spouse’s earnings.166 In some 
ways, this last idea can be seen as a neat modification to Ryznar’s 
proposal, curing the cliff defect with a varying increase based on the 
actual extent of the marital penalty. 
With these modifications, we could support the modified Bush or the 
modified Ryznar approach as possible viable alternatives to our MCS 
approach. On balance, though, we still favor our proposal since it has a 
significant administrative advantage over our modified Bush and Ryznar 
ideas. The joint rate bracket adjustments would differ from taxpayer to 
taxpayer under the modified Bush and Ryznar ideas based on the amount 
of the separately reported income. This would negate the standard 




Finally, recall how our proposal further adjusted the 1997 legislative 
proposal to maintain joint return filing even under the new separate 
calculation option. This adjustment captures the joint collaborative 
                                                     
164. See supra text accompanying note 118. 
165. Such reduction should stop once it hits the separate bracket amount. To illustrate, return to 
the familiar example with a singles cap of $100,000 for the lower 20% rate, with additional amounts 
taxed at 30%. Further, assume a joint bracket of $150,000 for the 20% rate (i.e., the middle ground 
approach—see supra text accompanying notes 60–62). Assume a couple has total income of 
$300,000: (i) the lower-earning spouse earns $100,000 of wages, (ii) the higher-earning spouse 
earns $150,000 of wages, and (iii) couple has $50,000 of interest income. If they cohabitate, 
$200,000 would be taxed at 20% with $100,000 taxed at 30% (i.e., each spouse would fill up the 
$100,000 bracket). If they married (without Bush’s relief), they would have a penalty, as only 
$150,000 would qualify for the lower 20% rate with $150,000 at the higher rate. Under Bush’s 
proposal, though, $250,000 would qualify for the lower rate ($100,000 by the low-earner filing 
separately; and then $150,000 on the joint return). Our suggested remedy to this defect of the Bush 
proposal is to reduce the joint bracket allowance by the income reported separately (but not below 
the singles bracket allowance). So on these facts, the $150,000 bracket allowance would be 
decreased down to $100,000 for this couple (thereby insuring that only $200,000 total qualifies for 
the lower rate). And with an eye on revenue concerns, the separate bracket could be set at $90,000 
rather than $100,000.  
166. But again, subject to an overall cap of twice the singles allowance (or perhaps a somewhat 
lower cap, like our proposal). Also, the increase should be triggered only to the extent the lower 
spouse’s earnings exceed the excess of the regular joint bracket allowance over the singles 
allowance (since the regular allowance already negates the penalty to that extent).  
167. In addition, note how under our modified Bush proposal, the adjustments would have to be 
made for each bracket applicable to the taxpayer in question.  
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virtue of both the Ryznar and Bush proposals,
168
 which likewise 
maintain joint filing. Essentially, married couples would complete a 
schedule for each spouse’s individual tax amount, providing a portion of 
the overall liability (similar to the current schedule for the alternative 
minimum tax liability).
169
 Our change to the 1997 proposal reinforces 
the notion that the tax system still views the spouses as a collaborative 
couple, with the MCS option providing a penalty relief safety valve. 
One other viable compromise possibility would allow taxpayers the 
option to pay the average of their tax bill (i) if they filed as two singles 
and (ii) if they filed jointly as a married couple. This would provide a 
50/50 compromise on the marital penalty by cutting it in half for all 
taxpayers.
170
 This idea also intrigues, as it shares many of our proposal’s 
attractive features. In particular, it provides even-handed penalty relief 
without bonus expansion. It also avoids the varying tax table problem of 
the modified Bush and Ryznar proposals. We still prefer our original 
idea on balance, though, given its greater flexibility. Specifically, our 
original idea allows varying penalty relief at different income levels 
rather than an ironclad 50% relief across the board.
171
 
D. Incoherence or Compromise of Competing Values? 
Lawrence Zelenak critiqued the 1997 legislative proposal on grounds 
of “philosophical incoherence.”172 Since our approach shares lineage 
with the 1997 proposal, we defend our MCS idea against a similar 
incoherence critique. As we develop further below, our approach 
provides a coherent response to the marriage penalty debate. First, the 
Obergefell developments now support the seemingly inconsistent split 
approach of penalty relief with bonus retention. In addition, any 
approach will contain legal inconsistencies given the many conflicting 
values in play. Our improvements to the 1997 proposal, however, 
minimize these legal inconsistencies. 
Consider first Zelenak’s coherence critique of the 1997 proposed 
single filing election. Zelenak sees couples neutrality as the sole reason 
                                                     
168. See supra text accompanying notes 101–102 and notes 118–119. 
169. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., OMB No. 1545–0074 Form 6251 (2015), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f6251.pdf [https://perma.cc/84ZQ-7ENV].  
170. We thank Carlton Smith for this intriguing suggestion.  
171. See Part IV.E for how the optimal relief likely varies at different income levels.  
172. See Zelenak, supra note 22, at 17–19; see also Easing the Family Tax Burden: Hearing 
Before the S. Committee on Finance, 107th Cong. 107-170, pp. 10–12 (Mar. 8, 2001) (testimony of 
Professor Zelenak), http://www.finance.senate.gov/hearings/hearing/download/?id=0fc7d303-0ccf-
4387-a049-45b3d16abb6e [https://perma.cc/R58X-MDW4]. 
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for the joint return system. As such, Zelenak argues that there are only 
two coherent options: (i) a joint return system without any enhanced 
separate filing;
173
 or (ii) an elimination of joint returns.
174
 
The current post-Obergefell environment, however, provides a 
broader perspective extending well beyond couples neutrality. In one 
direction, Obergefell challenges the continuation of large marital 
penalties that might discourage even-earner couples from exercising the 
fundamental right of marriage. But while Obergefell justifies penalty 
relief, it fails to mandate a simultaneous elimination of joint returns. If 
anything, Obergefell supports possible increases to the bonus aspect of 




Beyond Obergefell, factors other than couples neutrality support 
joint-return retention as part of marital penalty reform. As discussed 
above, these factors include transitional concerns, political feasibility, 
and the ability-to-pay norm.
176
 Finally, note how current law already 
suffers from Zelenak’s incoherence charge. Some married couples file 
separately under current law to pay less taxes than other married couples 
with identical aggregate items.
177
 Current law thus already sacrifices 
couples neutrality at times. 
Our proposal provides a coherent balancing of conflicting goals. In 
this regard, consider the following excerpt from a legal theorist on 
coherence in the law: 
[G]iven that one function of law is to settle disputes, it can never 
truly be univocal in its expression of value. Since disputes 
frequently arise in cases of competing values, and it is likely that 
the law will need to strike a balance between those competing 
concerns, it is exceedingly difficult to imagine a legal system 
that articulates a perfectly consistent set of values.
178
 
In this spirit, our approach provides maximum flexibility to balance 
all the important values. Rather than fully heeding one to the complete 
                                                     
173. This would maintain couples neutrality.  
174. This would reject couples neutrality. 
175. See supra text accompanying notes 99–102. 
176. As discussed above, the ability to pay norm includes the notion that a married couple living 
off the one breadwinner’s salary has lesser ability to pay than a single person with the same salary. 
See supra note 90–91 and accompanying text. 
177. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
178. Kenneth Ehrenberg, Pattern Languages and Institutional Facts: Functions and 
Coherences in the Law, in COHERENCE: INSIGHTS FROM PHILOSOPHY, JURISPRUDENCE AND 
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 155, 164 (Michal Araszkiewicz & Jaromír Šavelka eds., 2013). 
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exclusion of another, our approach presents the opportunity to reach the 
optimal level for each value after taking into account the inevitable 
tradeoffs. For instance, our approach relaxes the 1997 proposal’s rigid 
adherence to the full single brackets. By permitting lower MCS brackets, 
this provides more weight to couples neutrality, albeit with the tradeoff 
of some continued marital penalties. This highlights the inevitable 
tension between these two factors.
179
 Likewise, joint return elimination 
embraces fully marital neutrality to the complete exclusion of couples 
neutrality.
180
 We believe, however, that the best reform plan 
appropriately balances all these important values, without completely 
tossing some aside. 
E. Setting the Bracket Amounts 
In analyzing the optimal joint bracket allowances, Zelenak 
recommends an even-split presumption between bonuses and 
penalties.
181
 Under this approach, joint brackets generally would equal 
one-and-a-half times the singles amount. For instance, the 20% rate joint 
bracket would equal $150,000 in our earlier example with a $100,000 
singles cap.
182
 Zelenak would override this even-split presumption only 
upon compelling evidence.
183
 For instance, Zelenak would apply a 
higher increase at the lower income levels due to higher rates of 
cohabitation with children at such income levels.
184
 The improved tax 
treatment arguably would counteract the possible failure of these parents 
to weigh fully their children’s benefit from their own marriage. 
Interestingly, this low-income focus uncovers further revenue 
flexibility in our approach. As discussed above, current law eliminates 
tax rate penalties for low-income taxpayers through doubled joint 
allowances at the lower tax rates.
185
 But this costs additional revenue 
since these doubled joint brackets benefit all taxpayers who pass through 
these lower levels, including all higher income taxpayers.
186
 Our 
                                                     
179. Lowered allowances also heed the revenue raising function.  
180. It also ignores the desire to incentivize marriage and the ability-to-pay norm application to 
married couples. And absent special rules of implementation, it also raises transitional concerns. 
181. See Zelenak, supra note 60, at 816. 
182. The singles allowance was $100,000. $100,000 x 1.5 = $150,000. 
183. See Zelenak, supra note 60, at 816–17. 
184. Id.  
185. See supra section I.D. By doubled joint allowances, we mean joint brackets equal to twice 
the singles amount. 
186. To see this, recall our standard two-bracket structure with singles taxed at 20% on income 
up to $100,000. If the 20% joint bracket is higher than $100,000, say $150,000, even a millionaire 
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approach could provide MCS brackets equal to the singles amount with 
a corresponding decrease to the joint brackets at those levels. This would 
maintain the penalty avoidance for low-income taxpayers while boosting 
revenue collections from high-income taxpayers.
187
 
As an aside, another potential low-income taxpayer adjustment 
concerns the earned income tax credit (EITC).
188
 The current EITC 
contains various marital penalties stemming from its limited application 
to just low-income taxpayers. Similar to the broader rate-bracket penalty 
issue, the penalty arises from the current failure to double the 
disqualifying (higher) income levels for married taxpayers.
189
 Our MCS 
approach could provide a ready fix here as well: simply extend the 
separate calculation option to include the EITC.
190
 
In this section, we provide initial guidelines, rather than absolute 
parameters. We take this approach mindful of our proposal’s attractive 
flexibility. We hope to engage others in a fuller discussion of how to 
best utilize our improved balancing mechanism. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article significantly contributes to the long-running marital 
penalty literature. We highlight how the same-sex marriage 
developments both revitalize the tax analysis and alter the traditional tax 
landscape. In light of such developments, we provide an intriguing new 
mechanism for determining married couples’ taxes, the new married 
calculated separate (MCS) option. We also show how our approach 
improves upon the current law and other penalty-relief proposals. 
                                                     
earner currently benefits from this higher amount because the first $150,000 of the millionaire’s 
income would qualify for the lower rate. 
187. If the lower brackets are doubled, a married couple with one very high earner (and a very 
low or non-earner) would benefit from such bracket expansion by having more of their high-level 
income taxed at the lower rate. We could alternatively remove the low-bracket benefits for high-
income taxpayers by imposing even higher rates once income exceeds a high threshold. That 
alternative approach (low rates on first dollars with even higher rates on later dollars) is more 
distortive since the last (marginal) dollars face a higher rate. From an efficiency standpoint, it is 
generally preferable to have more balanced rates. This is because the distortion expands 
exponentially as the tax rate increases. See, e.g., Emmanuel Saez, Optimal Progressive Capital 
Income Taxes in the Infinite Horizon Model, 97 J. PUB. ECON. 61 (2013). 
188. I.R.C. § 32 (2012). 
189. See I.R.C § 32(b)(2)(A), (B)(i). 
190. The system might want to provide more limited EITC relief, however. For instance, the 
system might want to block a billionaire’s low-earner spouse from obtaining this benefit. See 
Zelenak, supra note 22, at 52–53. 
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Finally, we provide guidelines for the specific applications of our 
approach. 
In setting the stage, we explore how recent same-sex marriage 
developments transform the traditional goal of marital neutrality. Full 
appreciation of marriage as a fundamental right supports the reduction of 
marriage penalties but not of marriage bonuses. Recognition of the many 
state marital incentives corroborates this split approach to the penalty 
and bonus aspects of marital neutrality. In fact, Obergefell’s view of 
marriage may even support possible increases to marriage bonuses. On 
the other hand, tax revenue concerns
191
 caution against a combination of 




Mindful of these changing parameters, we see great appeal in 
severing penalty relief from bonus expansion. Our MCS proposal 
provides the most viable pathway. Under current law, married 
individuals who file separately receive tax brackets equal to just half the 
joint bracket allowance (thereby negating any penalty relief). By 
increasing these separate brackets above the current levels, our proposal 
would provide penalty relief without any simultaneous increase in 
marriage bonuses. In fact, such penalty relief might support decreases to 
certain joint bracket allowances.
193
 These decreases would create 
offsetting revenue benefits to help defray the cost of the penalty relief 
from the higher separate brackets. In addition, our proposal fosters joint 
collaboration by simply aggregating each spouse’s separate tax amounts 
on a joint return. 
Other recent proposals likewise combine penalty reduction with 
bonus retention, lending support to our split approach. We show the 
superiority of our approach over these other intriguing ideas. On the one 
hand, our proposal avoids the cliff effect and bonus entanglement 
problems of the interesting idea to grant only even-earner couples a 
higher joint bracket allowance. In the other direction, our MCS approach 
is more flexible and revenue friendly than a married filing single 
approach.
194
 We then utilize these principles to improve upon Jeb Bush’s 
                                                     
191. The reluctance to remove the alternative minimum tax despite widespread dissatisfaction 
evidences the extreme current focus on revenue implications. See supra note 106.  
192. As discussed above, these proposals would increase the joint marital brackets to twice the 
singles allowances. See supra text accompanying notes 104–05.  
193. That is, to the extent that the joint bracket allowance is attributable to penalty relief. See 
supra the discussion in Part IV.E. 
194. A married filing single approach would allow married individuals to use the singles 
brackets. Our enhanced married filing separate approach would expand the current married filing 
separate brackets, but not necessarily all the way to the singles allowance.  
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 With our modifications, this approach 
provides a plausible alternative pathway to reform, albeit at a greater 
administrative cost. Finally, we resisted the temptation to provide 
absolute parameters for each tax bracket level. Rather, we sketched 
guidelines to maintain maximum flexibility. We also hope that others 
will share the baton in making useful refinements now that we have 
highlighted the general framework and pathway for meaningful reform. 
Our MCS proposal would remove the tax incentives for couples to 
cohabitate in lieu of marriage or engage in legal antics like the Boyters. 
All couples could rightfully base the important marital decision on 
personal factors such as love, shared values, compatibility and the more 
appropriate legal implications of marriage. Obergefell requires no less. 
 
                                                     
195. Bush’s hybrid approach consists of a separate wage return with a joint investment income 
filing. Without our adjustment, Bush’s proposal goes too far, as it allows the low-earner spouse to 
use the singles bracket for wages and full use of the (higher) joint bracket allowance for the 
couples’ remaining income. 
